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The World Revolutionary Origins of the  
Crime of Aggression: Sovereignty, (Anti-)Imperialism,  
and the Soviet Union’s Contradictory  





Despite the importance of Soviet influences in developing an international legal basis 
for holding individuals criminally liable for planning and waging aggressive war at 
Nuremberg, relatively little research has been done on this innovation’s place within the 
broader Soviet agenda. In addressing this gap, this article provides a multifaceted account 
of how the criminalization of war both complemented and contradicted the Soviet 
Union’s prime objective of furthering world revolution. This entails a narrative that 
connects pivotal points in Soviet history from early critiques of imperialism to the 
experience of the Second World War to contentious appeals to the Third World in the 
decolonization context. While riddled with contradictions, these Soviet lessons have 
much to teach us in a contemporary global order where the crime of aggression is now 
within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, yet the underlying geopolitical 
aspects that have long animated this project demand further theoretical engagement.  
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In the final analysis it must be admitted that there is not and cannot be such a code 
of international law as would be equally acceptable to the cannibal and his victim, to the 
aggressor and the lover of freedom, to the “master race” and its potential “slaves,” to the 
champions of the sanctity of treaties and to those who would treat pacts as “scraps of 
paper,” to the advocates of humanising and abolishing war and to the proponents of 
totalitarian war, to those who “value the tear of every child” to quote Dostoyevsky, and 
to those who try to build a third or any other empire on a foundation of women’s corpses 
and children’s skulls. 
—Evgeny (Eugene) Korovin, 19461  
 
 
I. Introduction: The Consciousness of International Criminal Justice 
 
On December 15th, 2017, in a long-awaited move, the International Criminal Court 
(‘ICC’), the first permanent judicial forum established to prosecute individuals for the 
most serious international crimes, announced its jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression.
2
 This development represented the culmination of many years of negotiations 
regarding the scope, definition, and general appropriateness of including aggressive war 
as a core offense under the ICC’s Rome Statute alongside war crimes, genocide and 
 
1
 Eugene Korovin, The Second World War and International Law, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 742, 742-
743 (1946) [hereinafter: ‘Second World War’]. 
2
 Assembly Activates Court’s Jurisdiction over Crime of Aggression, International Criminal Court: 
Press Release, December 15, 2017, (available at: www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1350 
(last visited February 8, 2018). 




 In its progression from “a placeholder bereft of content” in the 
1998 Rome Statute
4
 through rigorous rounds of debate and compromise over a definition 
of ‘aggression’ during the 2010 Kampala Accords, the prospect of imposing criminal 
liability on the planners and wagers of unjustifiable war through a permanent 
international forum raised numerous difficulties.
5
 When considering the nature of the 
post-Cold War resurrection of international criminal law, these challenges related to 
prosecuting aggression are unsurprising. After all, while individual prosecutions for war 
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity witnessed a resurgence in the post-Cold 
War era, especially through the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda in addition to the ICC, there has not been an international 
prosecution for planning or waging aggressive war since 1947.
6
 
For proponents of international criminal justice, the ongoing failure to effectively 
adjudicate acts of aggression presents a distinct dilemma. On the one hand, this dearth 
of prosecution can be viewed as the abandonment international criminal law’s 
foundational legacies forged at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials that placed primary 
emphasis on crimes against peace.
7
 On the other hand, actually implementing such 
prosecutions in the contemporary world entails numerous doctrinal and institutional 
challenges, some inherited from earlier eras, some entirely new.
8
 Anxiety over meeting 
these challenges is abundantly clear in the observations of mainstream international 
lawyers writing on this topic.
9
 For these scholars, perhaps the most prominent issue is the 
way the crime of aggression intertwines law and politics in a manner that undermines 
ideally ‘apolitical’ modes of judicial reasoning.10 Additionally, there is the argument that, 
 
3
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 17 July 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998), entered into force July 1, 2002, at Article 5(1). 
4
 Tom Dannenbaum, Why Have We Criminalized Aggressive War?, 126 YALE L. J. 1242, 1245 
(2017); see Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Article 5(2). 
5
 Concluded on June 11
th
 2010, the Kampala Accords definition can be found appended to the 
Rome Statute: Id., at Art. 8bis (1) (2); For an account of this negotiation process see generally 
Claus Kress & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 
8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 179 (2010).   
6
 Danilo Zolo, Who is Afraid of Punishing Aggressors? On the Double-Track Approach to 
International Criminal Justice, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 799, 799 (2007). 
7
 Id., at 801; This foundational moment acts as a vital legitimizing anchor for the post-Cold War 
resurgence of international criminal justice. See Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 90 (2003).  
8
 This raises the question of how foundational legal justifications conflict with subsequent 
political evolution. As Judith Shklar has famously argued, while the Nuremberg trial was deeply 
flawed from a legalistic perspective, its breach of legality is justified by the fact that it served 
substantive political ends in a specific context (LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL 
TRIALS 145 (1964)). On this view, given the different substantive politics present in other sites of 
international criminal justice intervention, the loose approach to legality that justified 
Nuremberg does not apply in the same way elsewhere. Samuel Moyn, Judith Shklar versus the 
International Criminal Court, 4 HUMANITY 473, 487-488 (2013).    
9
 As a preliminary matter, it is important to highlight these points before engaging in the left 
critique, both to avoid conflation and to showcase the mainstream consciousness of international 
criminal law as it currently exists.  
10
 This sensibility informed the U.S. position under the Obama Administration where, despite a 
far more positive approach to the ICC compared to the preceding Bush Administration, the crime 
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given the need to strictly separate jus ad bellum (the justification for resorting to war) 
from jus in bello (the acceptable standards of conduct during war), the ICC is ill-equipped 
to prosecute the ad bellum issue of aggression given that it already prosecutes in bello 
issues.
11
 Furthermore, since the ICC fashions itself as a ‘court of last resort’ that places 
primacy on domestic prosecution via the principle of complementarity, how might 
aggression and its emphasis on violence between states as opposed to within states 
threaten to undermine this fundamental jurisdictional dynamic?
12
 Moreover, while 
aggression has its ideal defendant, namely a national leader, what is to be done when 
prosecuting other types of individuals would better serve the ends of post-conflict 
justice?
13
 Given this wide-ranging (yet by no means exhaustive) array of compounding 
issues, the question of whether the crime of aggression in its current form possesses the 
 
of aggression, as agreed to at Kampala, has remained a bridge too far. Harold Koh & Todd 
Buchwald, The Crime of Aggression: The United States Perspective, 109 AM J. INT’L L. 257, 263 
(2015) (“Aggression determinations…fundamentally require a political assessment and political 
management…assigning that role to ostensibly political Court would inject the ICC into 
treacherous political waters that would threaten to undermine both the Court’s credibility and that 
of the greater international criminal justice project.”); For a view representative of Bush 
Administration hostility see e.g. John Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International 
Criminal Court from America’s Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2001); For a 
wide-ranging theory of the crime of aggression’s challenges in this capacity see generally Noah 
Weisbord, Judging Aggression, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 82 (2011). 
11
 Andreas Paulus, Second Thoughts on the Crime of Aggression, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1117, 1126 
(2009); The argument here is that a base constraint on the conduct of hostilities should apply in 
all conflicts regardless of their reasons. For a detailed defense of strictly separating jus ad 
bellum/jus in bello within international law see generally Robert Sloan, The Cost of Conflation: 
Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 
YALE J. INT’L L. 47 (2009).  
12
 This is especially true considering how “[t]he ICC Statute basically places the aggressor-state in 
the ‘driver’s seat’ in relation to the adjudication of the crime of aggression” regarding its ability to 
not prosecute a leader for political reasons or refuse to provide the evidence needed to render a 
conviction for aggression by claiming vital security interests. Nicolaos Strapstas, Complementarity 
and Aggression: A Ticking Time Bomb?, in FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 450, 459 (Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik, eds. 2010). 
13
 See Mark Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the Gains, 41 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 291, 317 (2009) (“[T]he inability of anyone to below the absolute leader 
might have broader implications…[for] bestowing collective innocence upon this vast array of 
individuals might inhibit the ability of truth commissions, public inquiries, reparations, restitution, 
reintegrative processes and other forms of justice at the national level…”); For a case-study of a 
historical episode supporting this claim see e.g. Mark Drumbl, ‘Germans are Lords and Poles are 
the Servants’: The Trial of Arthur Greiser in Poland, 1946, in THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR 
CRIMES TRIALS  41 (Gerry Simpson & Kevin Jon Heller, eds. 2013); Moreover, contextualized 
within the history of liability for aggression, such possibilities are more restricted now than in the 
formation of this crime given that the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression’s 
culpability standard, whereby a perpetrator must ‘direct or control’ an act of aggression, is far 
more narrow than the ‘shape or influence’ standard applied by the International Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg. Kevin Jon Heller, Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership Requirement in the 
Crime of Aggression, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 477, 479 (2007); On the codified status of the Special 
Working Group’s culpability standard see Rome Statute, supra note 4, at Article 25 (3 bis.). 
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requisite degree of legitimacy needed to sustain itself as an enduring feature of the 
international legal order remains open for debate.
14
              
This mainstream approach has dominated discourse on the crime of aggression. In 
the process, it has compartmentalized complicating issues into narrow doctrinal and 
institutional formulations assuming the liberal premise that, with a sufficient amount of 
reform, international law is actually capable of achieving its self-proclaimed ideals as a 
progressive, apolitical, and universally legitimate body of rules and principles.
15
 As a 
result, there has been minimal effort to comprehensively engage these issues from the 
radical left, even though this approach can provide deep insight into the legitimacy issues 
that frequently manifest in the practices of international criminal justice.
16
 By turning our 
attention to the material conditions that generate specific social relations (and the 
ideologies justifying them), a radical engagement forces us to confront how mainstream 
international criminal law produces a specific mode of consciousness regarding the 
causes of, and solutions to, mass atrocities. According to Tor Krever, international 
criminal law’s isolated fixation on the conduct of individual defendants systematically 
diverts our attention away from structural pathologies that produce atrocity-generating 
conditions.
17
 While acknowledging these forces does not foreclose individual 
responsibility, it does complicate the way we approach the interplay between structure 
and agency when holistically confronting these issues.
18
 Against this backdrop, Krever 
 
14
 See generally Sean Murphy, Aggression, Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court, 20 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1147 (2009) (A critique of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression’s definition through an application of Tom Franck’s theory of international legal 
legitimacy). 
15
 A problem with international criminal justice in this regard is that its discourse on politics has 
been predominantly focused on the political will needed for institution-building and the exclusion 
of political bias from adjudication. As such it fails to confront how the very idea of the ‘apolitical’ 
international criminal trial raises political issues in and of itself see Tor Krever, Unveiling (and 
Veiling) Politics in International Criminal Trials, in CRITICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 117, 131 (Christine Schwöbel, ed., 2014); On the related 
need to critically confront international criminal law at the level of its very purpose as a means of 
avoiding the field-affirming pitfalls of ‘pre-fab’ critiques see Grietje Baars, Making ICL History: 
On the Need to Move Beyond Pre-Fab Critiques of ICL, in CRITICAL APPROACHES TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 196, 209 (Christine Schwöbel, ed., 2014). 
16
 According to Sara Kendall’s depiction of the mainstream and its limits: “[s]uch international 
criminal scholarship has a positivist focus on decisions and judgments while sidestepping critical 
engagement understood…as the examination of underlying presuppositions and animating 
forces…[y]et the need for critical engagement is more acute given the developing crisis of 
legitimacy manifesting at the institutional sites of international criminal law production.” Critical 
Orientations: A Critique of International Criminal Court Practice, in CRITICAL APPROACHES TO 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 54, 56-57 (Christine Schwöbel, ed., 
2014). 
17
 An example provided is the Former Yugoslavia where the social deprivation and instability 
produced by the International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment policies help to provide a 
platform for ethno-nationalist demagogues and recruit individuals for their campaigns of violence. 
However, the ability to make these links was categorically excluded from the international criminal 
adjudications that followed these conflicts. See Tor Krever, International Criminal Law: An 
Ideology Critique, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 701, 715-718 (2013). 
18
 Id., at 719. 
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“invites us first to consider the conditions under which international crimes occur, the 
material context of violence and social conflict, if we are to challenge and repoliticize that 
context.”19              
Mainstream international criminal law’s reductively individualizing mode of 
consciousness often pays insufficient attention to the contexts surrounding the crime of 
aggression. As Krever notes, geopolitical rivalries often produce the type of mass violence 
whose aftermath international criminal law ostensibly addresses; yet, the process itself 
largely remains outside of its analytical scope.
20
 However, through explicitly confronting 
this disconnect, a critical analysis of the crime of aggression presents a unique vantage 
point for engaging the geopolitical questions and concerns frequently disavowed by 
international lawyers.
21
 For unlike other international crimes that deal directly with the 
suffering of individuals contrasted with trans-spatial conceptions of the “universal 
consciences of humanity,” the crime of aggression’s focus on one state’s violence against 
another state highlights the vast disparity of sovereign power relations within the 
international order.
22
 This constrains the ability of international criminal justice 
proponents to retreat into the all-too-convenient belief that a cosmopolitan, post-
sovereign, borderless world order is progressively being achieved.
23
 Given this backdrop, 
 
19
 Id., at 723; On this point, it can be asserted that using existing adjudicatory fora to address ‘banal’ 
international crimes can provide a unique means of confronting structural injustices. See e.g. 
Ionannis Kalpouzos & Itamar Mann, Banal Crimes Against Humanity: The Case of Asylum 
Seekers in Greece, 16 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1 (2015).  
20
 See Tor Krever, Ending Impunity? Eliding Political Economy in International Criminal Law, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LAW 298, 301-305 (Ugo Mattei & 
John Haskell, eds., 2015). 
21
 According to one account of this discursive structure of disavowal and depoliticization 
amongst international lawyers: “Collective powers, especially aggressive nations, are deplorable 
facts, and the well-intentioned lawyer has simply to protect the individual victims of these 
scourges. It is then not necessary to engage in any robust understanding of the conflicts 
occurring among the Powers. The very mention of geopolitics would be an invitation to a 
‘devil’s science.’” Anthony Carty, The Crime of Aggression−The Crime which Cannot Speak 
its Name, BRIT. YBK. INT’L L. 1, 24 (2019). 
22
 This point is illustrated by Zolo’s posing of the question of why the military and political 
leadership of NATO were not tried before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia for planning and executing the 1999 bombing of Kosovo despite its breaching of the 
UN Charter’s ban of the use of force (absent self-defense or a Security Council-approved 
collective security measures)? Zolo, supra note 7, at 804-805; Given Zolo’s long-standing calls for 
a realism in the face of messianic international legal projects, it is reasonable to interpret this 
question as a condemnation of cosmopolitan hypocrisy as opposed to any serious proposal to 
build the institutions capable of this extraordinary feat of adjudication. See e.g. DANILO ZOLO, 
COSMOPOLIS: PROSPECTS FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT (1995); Danilo Zolo, A Cosmopolitan 
Philosophy of International Law? A Realist Approach, 12 RATIO JURIS 429 (1999).   
23
 On the ICC’s fundamental commitment to sovereign borders despite the force of cosmopolitan 
rhetoric in sustaining the international criminal justice project see Nadia Chazal, Beyond 
Borders? The International Criminal Court and the Geopolitics of International Criminal Justice, 
22 GRIFFITH L. REV. 707, 718 (2013); For an example of this type of celebratory account of 
international criminal justice, see e.g. Stephen Rapp, The Reach and Grasp of International 
Criminal Justice– How Do We Lengthen the Arm of the Law?, 45 CASE WES. RES. J. INT’L L. 
651 (2013). 
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the normative force latent in prosecuting  crimes of aggression emanates from its unique 
embodiment of what I deem the “geopolitical dimension of global justice.”24         
While mainstream international criminal legal theory has long sidestepped these 
normative questions surrounding geopolitics (or used them to critique international 
criminal justice as a self-defeating enterprise
25
), I argue that enhanced critical engagement 
on these issues provides profound opportunities to re-imagine the international criminal 
justice project as something far more than simply a body of rules and institutions. The 
undertheorized status of the “geopolitical dimension of global justice” demands that we 
confront how our imaginations of international criminal justice came to be shaped by a 
multitude of historical, political, and cultural forces typically minimized, evaded, or 
ignored by standard doctrinal accounts.
26
 A historical exploration of the Soviet Union’s 
multi-faceted, and deeply contradictory, relationship to the crime of aggression, I suggest, 
offers a specific site for such a re-imagination.  
After all, liberal narratives of international criminal justice, even counter-hegemonic 
ones, typically avoid critically evaluating geopolitics through abstracted invocations of 
transcendent morality.
27
 In the process, these narratives fetishize sovereign states as moral 
persons in a manner that ideologically excludes the ways in which other entities—be they 
sub-state movements, social classes, or transnational forces—are constitutive of these 
realities and can assert legitimacy claims on this basis.
28
 By contrast, the Marxist 
 
24
 While the phrase ‘global justice’ has been applied in a diverse array of contexts by a diverse 
array of actors (see generally Duncan French, Global Justice and the (Ir)Relevance of 
Indeterminacy, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 593 (2009)), by adopting this terminology in relation to the 
subject matter discussed in this article I seek to further critical analysis of global justice-
international criminal justice relationship which, despite much reflexive conflation, remains 
profoundly under-theorized. See Frédéric Mégret, What Sort of Global Justice is ‘International 
Criminal Justice’?, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 77, 79 (2015). 
25
 This has been especially true of the neoconservative-associated view that U.S. geopolitical 
supremacy is necessary for a legitimate global order and the ability of cosmopolitan actors to 
evaluate the U.S.’s means of maintaining this end through a discourse of criminality is ineffectual 
at best and catastrophically dangerous at worst. See e.g. Bolton, supra note 11; Jack Goldsmith, 
The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (2003) Jeremey Rabkin, 
Global Criminal Justice: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 754 (2005); 
The latest installment of this saga has been U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton’s threats 
to sanction the ICC for its perceived undermining of U.S. interests. Full Text of John Bolton’s 
Speech to the Federalist Society, Al-Jezeera September 10, 2018 (available at: 
www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/full-text-john-bolton-speech-federalist-society-
180910172828633.html) (last visited January 21, 2019).  
26
 On the case for radically expanding the scope of our archive in the analysis of international 
criminal law as a corrective to the contingent distorting effects of nineteenth-century international 
legal positivism’s fixation on the “modern state conception” as the exclusive source of binding law 
see Ziv Boher, International Criminal Law’s Millennium of Forgotten History, 34 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 393, 404-407 (2016). 
27
 For such a counter-hegemonic disavowal of geopolitics in the quest for justice see e.g. Richard 
Falk, Severe State Crime and Double Standards, 4 STATE CRIME J. 4 (2015). 
28
 For a classical exemplification of this type of this fetishistic centering of the sovereign state in the 
name of justifying a liberal theory of international morality, see e.g. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND 
UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (5th ed., 2015); On 
the frustration of sub-national legitimacy claims through state-centric legal and ethical 
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commitment to radically uplifting humanity through world revolution led the Soviets to 
situate the material realities of geopolitics (including their multilayered social 
construction) as vital considerations in relation to normative goals.
29
 Centering this 
alternative engagement can expand our present consciousness by exposing the ways in 
which Soviet contributions to the formation of international criminal law informed by 
Marxist insights were subordinated to a liberal Western narrative through a series of 
historical contingencies as opposed to any natural truth.
30
              
Questions of empire and imperialism were central to Soviet geopolitical praxis, and 
efforts to criminalize aggression were no exception.
31
 With the imperial legacy’s 
emergence as a key discourse for confronting contemporary inequities within the 
international criminal justice project, particularly in relation to the claim that it 
 
presumptions, see generally Jessica Whyte, The “Dangerous Concept of Just War”: 
Decolonization, Wars of National Liberation, and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions, 9 HUMANITY 313 (2019). Moreover, when considering the disjuncture between 
class and geopolitics in liberal internationalist thought (especially in the U.S.), we must note how 
responses to the Vietnam War triggered a transition from moral reasoning centered on the 
domestic welfare state to moral reasoning centered international affairs. On this shift, see generally 
Katrina Forrester, Citizenship, War, and the Origins of International Ethics in American Political 
Philosophy, 1960-1975, 57 HISTORICAL J. 773 (2014).   
29
 See Bernard Semmel, Introduction, in MARXISM AND THE SCIENCE OF WAR 1, 3 (Bernard 
Semmel, ed., 1981); Conversely, geopolitics were inseparable from the greater social totality that 
dictated their manifestation. See V.D. Sokolovskii, The Nature of Modern War, in MARXISM 
AND THE SCIENCE OF WAR 276, 276 (Bernard Semmel, ed., 1981) (“Historical experience shows 
that even the greatest world war….represents only one aspect of social development and 
completely depends upon the course of that development and upon the political interactions 
between classes and states.”). 
30
 On the role of limited Soviet media success compared to the West in disseminating their 
popular version of Nuremberg see Francine Hirsch, The Soviets at Nuremberg: International 
Law, Propaganda, and the Making of the Postwar Order, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 701, 722-723 
(2008); Additionally, in a manner further alienating Soviet ideological ownership over 
Nuremberg, the Western Allies used this event to disseminate a particular understanding of 
capitalism whereby peaceful commercial relations were set as opposing a war-based international 
order. Here the Soviets’ continued non-integration within this regime stood out as a deviation in 
relation to the capitalist ethos for which Nuremberg, at least partially, was positioned to stand. See 
Kim Christian Priemal, “A Story of Betrayal”: Conceptualizing Variants of Capitalism in the 
Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, 85 J. MOD. HIST 69, 69 (2013); On the ways in which this 
sensibility was apparent in the non-conviction of Nazi industrial actors see Id., at 100-104; See 
also Grietje Baars, Capitalism’s Victor’s Justice: The Hidden Story the Prosecution of 
Industrialists Post-World War II, in THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 163 
(Gerry Simpson & Kevin Jon Heller, eds., 2014). 
31
 As a general note on terminology, unless specified elsewhere, ‘Colonialism’ refers to 
subjection to alien rule; ‘Postcolonialism’ refers to the condition whereby formalized alien rule 
has ended but its legacies remain deeply entrenched; ‘Decolonizing’ refers to the broadly 
construed efforts to undo the legacies of colonialism; ‘Imperialism’ refers to the specific mode 
of global relations defined by capitalist competition coined by Lenin (see infra Part II.C.); and 
‘Third World’ refers to the array of postwar/Cold War political projects centered in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America that emphasized the unique position of these nations as irreducible to 
either the Western or Eastern blocs. 
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pathologizes certain acts of violence while normalizing others,
32
 engagement with the 
Soviet saga has much to offer.
33
 After all, while the Soviet project centered on identifying 
and confronting the dynamics of imperialism in pursuit of world revolution, in the 
process there emerged deep contradictions fueled by the extraordinary pressures the 
Soviet Union faced both internally and externally. Given that the Soviet approach to 
criminalizing aggression functioned as a variable repository for these entangled 
contradictions, analytically deconstructing them possesses great potential to expose many 
of the “underlying presuppositions and animating forces” Sara Kendall has identified as 
 
32
 On the continuity of these legacies through disparate portrayals of victimhood see John 
Reynolds and Sujith Xavier, ‘The Dark Corners of the World:’ TWAIL and International 
Criminal Justice, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. J. 959 (2016) (A comparative study of international criminal 
justice narratives showing how situations in Darfur and Sierra Leone were cast in the language of 
universal morality that was absent when applied to ICC engagements by Palestinians and Sri 
Lankan Tamils); Furthermore, it must be noted that responses to colonialism-invoking critiques 
by prominent individuals have demonstrated a disturbing lack of meaningful dialogue. This was 
exemplified by the former ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s comparison of such 
ICC critics to Holocaust deniers. See Itamar Mann & Ntina Tzouvala, Letter to the Editor: 
Response to Luis Moreno Ocampo on Comparisons to Holocaust Denial, Just Security, 
(November 1, 2017) (available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/34016/letter-editor-conflating-icc-
african-bias-holocaust-denial-polarizing-dangerous-irresponsible/) (last visited July 7, 2018).  
33
 In this capacity, I engage the international legal dimensions of how the Soviets as Marxist actors 
navigated both the prospects and challenges presented by appealing to the colonial/postcolonial 
worlds (On the Soviets’ original primary focus on exporting their revolution to the industrial West 
as opposed to the Global South see FRIEDMAN, infra note 242, at 7-8). As such, this study falls at 
the intersection of the contemporary projects of Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL) seeking to account for international law’s historic and ongoing inequities from the 
perspectives of colonialized/postcolonial peoples, and Marxist international legal theories seeking 
to show international law’s material and ideological complicity in the reproduction of capitalist 
political economy to the exclusion of alternative social relations (For key texts in the former 
movement see e.g. BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: 
DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003); ANTONY 
ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); 
SUNDHYA PAHUJA DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC 
GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY (2011); For key texts in the later movement see 
e.g. SUSAN MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY (2000); CHINA MIÉVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL 
RIGHTS: A MARXIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); BILL BOWRING, THE 
DEGRADATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER? THE REHABILITATION OF LAW AND 
THE POSSIBILITY OF POLITICS (2008)); While these two projects are profoundly similar in their 
explicit radical advocacy for a more equitable and inclusive global order, their developmental 
trajectories have largely run parallel to one another and serious theoretical focus on their 
interaction is only now gaining attention. See e.g. Robert Knox, A Critical Examination of the 
Concept of Imperialism in Marxist and Third World Approaches to International Law (2014) 
(unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, London School of Economics) (paper on file with author); 
Robert Knox, Valuing Race? Stretched Marxism and the Logic of Imperialism, 4 LONDON REV. 
INT’L L. 81 (2016); B.S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES (2
nd
 edn., 2017). 
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Relatedly, this article confronts the problematic trope where, in the words of Boris 
Mamlyuk, “dominant general histories of international law tend to treat the Soviet 
approaches to international law as anomalous—as aberrant deviations from the ceaseless 
teleological development of liberal international law doctrines and institutions.”35 This 
presumption is deeply influenced by the liberal premise that Marxism’s all-encompassing 
politicization renders it incompatible with the ‘rule of law’ where incontestable ethical 
standards legitimately constrain the exercise of political discretion.
36
 Thus, influential 
figures who measure progress in international law by this liberal ‘rule of law’ standard 
have long condemned the Soviet Union as insufficiently committed to this project and 
thus comparable to Nazi Germany under the broad rubric of ‘totalitarianism.’37 Through 
this framing, the Soviet project is reducible to the Stalinist violence and repression that 
is presented not as a result of historical contingency, but as confirmation of the first 
principle that liberal conceptions of ‘human rights,’ ‘democracy,’ and the ‘rule of law’ are 
pillars of any decent social order.
38
   
However, a great advantage of international law’s critical ‘turn to history’ is that such 
liberal triumphalist narratives are far more difficult to sustain. After all, this turn has 
exposed the ways in which liberal notions of humanitarianism and legal order not only 
failed to prevent but indispensably enabled acts of colonial violence on a far grander 
 
34
 Kendall, supra note 17, at 57. 
35
 Boris Mamlyuk, Decolonization as a Cold War Imperative: Bandung and the Soviets, in 
BANDUNG, GLOBAL HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL PASTS AND PENDING 
FUTURES 196, 198 (Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri, & Vasuki Nesiah, eds., 2017) [Hereinafter: 
‘Decolonization.’]. 
36
 See e.g. Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections After the Collapse of 
Communism, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 633 (1990). 
37
 See e.g. John Herz & Joseph Florin, Bolshevist and National Socialist Doctrines of International 
Law: A Case Study of the Functions of Social Science in the Totalitarian Dictatorships, 7 SOC. 
RES. 1, 17-18 (1940); Quincy Wright, International Law and Totalitarian States, 35 AM. POLI. 
SCI. REV. 738 (1941); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TOTALITARIAN 
LAWLESSNESS (1943); For a critique of blanket assertion of the term ‘totalitarianism’ see generally 
SLAVOJ ZIZEK, DID SOMEBODY SAY TOTALITARIANISM? (2001); In this context ‘ideology’ was 
frequently a label affixed to interpretations of international law, regardless of their substantive 
content, that deviated from the liberal baseline, see e.g. Kurt Wilk, International Law and Global 
Ideological Conflict: Reflections on the Universality of Law, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 648 (1951); 
Quincy Wright, International Law and Ideologies, 48 AM. J. INT’L L. 616 (1954); For an analysis 
of international law and ideology as it has developed in the Marxist tradition, see generally MARKS, 
supra note 34. 
38
 For proponents of this view, the end of the Cold War in 1989 was perceived as a massive victory 
for liberal humanitarianism over those, namely the Soviets and their allies, who were content to 
justify untold suffering in the name of sovereignty see e.g. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Revolution of 
the Spirit, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1990); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights 
in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866 (1990); Given the Soviet Union’s 
collapse just a few years later, it is unsurprising that contemporaneous Soviet theories of human 
rights formulated against this backdrop received barely any attention. See e.g. Rein Müllerson, 
Human Rights and the Individual as a Subject of International Law: A Soviet View, 1 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 33 (1990). 
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scale than anything attributable to the Soviets.
39
 That said, if we consider international law 
as a world-historical phenomenon, as opposed to a narrow body of rules and principles, 
invoking an uncritical measure of ‘violence’ to exclude the Soviets from the narrative of 
international legal development is incoherent. On this basis, taking the Soviet Union 
seriously in the history of international law goes hand-in-hand with the need to go beyond 




In light of this assertion, this article speaks to numerous trends in contemporary 
international legal theory that have opened themselves to such an approach by adopting 
a critical view of this field’s recurring tropes.41 Here, in addition to contributing to Marxist 
international legal theory and Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL),
42
 by viewing the Soviet’s perception of international law on their own terms, 
this study also invokes the increasingly prominent discourse of ‘Comparative 
International Law,’ an approach that decenters international law’s generally assumed 
universality by taking seriously the differences in the substance and application of 
international law as it is engaged by differently situated actors.
43
 Moreover still, through 
its deliberate focus on contributions from the Soviet and colonial/postcolonial worlds, 
this study furthers the emerging ‘Global History of International Law’ that seeks to 
transcend the limits of Western perception of what international law is and what it can 
be.
44
   
 
39
 Of the multitude of examples available, the Belgian Congo offers one particularly jarring 
illustration where the assumption of personalized rule by King Leopold II over a vast swath of 
central African territory resulted in the death of millions. See generally ADAM HOCHSCHILD, 
KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 
(1998); On the coordinated deployments of international legal, free trade, and humanitarian 
discourses in bringing about this result see e.g. Andrew Fitzmaurice, The Justification of King 
Leopold’s Congo Enterprise by Sir Travers Twiss, in LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITISH COLONIAL 
THOUGHT: TRANSPOSITIONS OF EMPIRE (Shaunnagh Dorset & Ian Hunter, eds., 2010); 
Matthew Craven, Between Law and History: The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 and the Logic of 
Free Trade, 3 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 31 (2015). 
40
 See John Comaroff, Re-Marx on Repression and the Rule of Law, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
671, 674 (1990). 
41
 On the example of ‘progress’ narratives as one of the most foundational tropes in this capacity 
see generally THOMAS SKOUTERIS, THE NOTION OF PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
DISCOURSE (2010). 
42
 See supra note 27. 
43
 See e.g. Martti Koskenniemi, The Case for Comparative International Law, 20 FINN. YBK. 
INT’L L. 1 (2009); Ugo Mattei & Boris Mamlyuk, Comparative International Law, 35 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 385, 405 (2011); LAURI MÄLKSOO, RUSSIAN APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2015); ONUMA YASUAKI, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A TRANSCIVILIZATIONAL WORLD (2017); 
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Anthea Roberts, Paul B. Stephens, Pierre-Hugues 
Verdier, & Mila Versteeg eds., 2018) 
44
 This project has been long stunted by over-reliance on canonical sources (namely the works of 
classical doctrinal publicists including Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, & Emer de Vattel) that 
have methodologically reproduced default Western perspectives in a manner contradicting 
international law’s claims to legitimacy on the basis of its self-styled universality. Rose Sydney 
Parfitt, The Spectre of Sources, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 297, 298, 306 (2014); For recent explorations 
contributing to this ‘Global History of International Law’ see e.g. ARNULF BECKER LORCA, 
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By speaking to so many different discourses, this article touches upon numerous 
debates surrounding methodology in the production of international legal history.
45
 In 
short, what can no longer be ignored is an enhanced focus on the way scholars justify 
their choices of sources and subject matter when writing histories of international law, 




MESTIZO INTERNATIONAL LAW: A GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, 1842-1933 (2015); C.H. 
ALEXANDROWICZ, THE LAW OF NATIONS IN GLOBAL HISTORY (David Armitage & Jennifer 
Pitts, eds., 2017); BANDUNG, GLOBAL HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL PASTS 
AND PENDING FUTURES (Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri, & Vasuki Nesiah, eds. 2018); ROSE 
SYDNEY PARFITT, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REPRODUCTION: INEQUALITY, 
HISTORIOGRAPHY, RESISTANCE (2019).  
45
 While historically engaged, this article is more concerned with demonstrating international law’s 
construction of meaning through the genealogical linkage of events than it is with the conventional 
historian’s task of rigorously determining the multi-faceted contextual setting of historical actors 
above all else (see e.g. J.G.A. Pocock, On the Unglobality of Contexts: Cambridge Methods and 
the History of Political Thought, 4 GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 1 (2019)). On this 
methodological distinction between the work of critical international lawyers and context-focused 
historians when approaching the past see Anne Orford, On International Legal Method, 1 
LONDON REV. INT’L L. 166, 171-174 (2013) (Interestingly, Orford’s usage of genealogy does not 
extensively draw upon Michel Foucault’s iconic formulation of this method (see Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History, in THE FOUCAULT READER (Paul Rainbow, ed., 1984)). For a conjunctive 
reading of both Orford and Foucault’s usage of genealogy as they relate to the practice of critical 
international legal history, see PARFITT, supra note 45, at 21-27). This approach is justified given 
that my aim in this article is to expand our imaginative confrontation of the very idea of 
international criminal justice and the political questions it has consistently raised since its 
inception. After all, a rigid emphasis on historical context can contradict this stated purpose given 
that the conventional historian’s task of distinguishing the past from the present can easily lead to 
the presumption that, due to their unique contexts, historically-situated ideas are irrelevant to 
political engagements in the here and now. Orford, supra note 51, at 174 (“To refuse to think 
about the ways in which a concept or text from the remote past might be recovered to do new 
work in the present is to refuse an overt engagement with contemporary politics.”); On this issue 
within international criminal justice specifically see generally Frédéric Mégret, International 
Criminal Justice History Writing as Anachronism: The Past that did not Lead to the Present, in 
THE NEW HISTORIES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: RETRIALS 72 (Immi Tallgren & 
Thomas Skouteris, eds., 2019) (However, an important caveat here is that these lawyer-historian 
methodological controversies have largely concerned the mainstream ‘Cambridge School’ of 
history and have yet to rigorously extend to alternative conceptualizations developed within the 
field of history see Martin Clark, Ambivalence, anxieties/Adaptations, advances: Conceptual 
History and International Law, 31 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 747, 755-757 (2018)). This can easily 
become problematic when confronting arguments, including many that emerged in the context of 
the Soviet experiment, that were both raised with the explicit purpose of being universally 
transformative and speak to issues that have yet to be resolved in the present. On the case for 
revisiting the animating purpose of the Soviet experiment in light of the failures of post-Cold War 
utopian promises to succeed on their own terms see PHILIP CUNLIFFE, LENIN LIVES! 
REIMAGINING THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1917-2017 1-23 (2017). 
46
 On the long-standing absence of this type of justification, see Martti Koskenniemi, A History of 
International Law Histories, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 943, 961 (Anne Peters & Bardo Fassbender, eds., 2012); My main usage of primary sources 
consists of translations/publications in Western venues that had the purpose of persuasively 
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while there are multiple angles for exploring the Soviet place within the crime of 
aggression (and international law more generally), in the interest of broadly engaging 
contemporary discourses, one work I deem particularly deserving of a response is Oona 
Hathaway and Scott Shapiro’s The Internationalists.47 A rare merger of highly accessible 
prose and complex interdisciplinary analysis, this work presents a concise, yet elaborately 
justified, account of the twentieth-century emergence of the ban on inter-state war under 
international law and why it must be rigorously defended today.  
However, while Hathaway and Shapiro emphasize the central role of ‘radical ideas’ 
in this development, their narrative is one triumphalist liberal internationalism that does 
not engage Marxist actors or ideas on any significant level.
48
 Addressing this absence 
 
promoting Soviet visions of criminalizing aggression on an international scale as part of the export 
of communist world revolution that was the modus operandi of the Soviet Union.  In constructing 
an account on this basis, I center key texts by the Soviet jurists Aron Trainin and Eugene Korovin 
due to the reality they offered broadly-relevant theoretical insights on international law despite a 
parochialism-generating pressure on Stalinist-era academics to ‘toe the party line’ or face the 
harshest of consequences. See Herz & Florin, supra note 38, at 17-18 (1940)); This was especially 
true of Andrei Vyshinsky, the Soviets’ representative at Nuremberg who had earlier attained 
infamy as the architect of Stalin’s show trials. See Hirsch, supra note 31, at 705; see also ARKADY 
VAKSBERG, STALIN’S PROSECUTOR: THE LIFE OF ANDREI VYSHINSKY (Jan Butler, trans., 1991). 
All of that said, an acknowledged casualty of this focus is a generalized lack of engagement with 
the original-language materials and more detailed contextual considerations that would be 
necessary for any truly comprehensive account of the Soviet view of the crime of aggression. Thus, 
by positioning a limited number of texts as attention-directing artifacts within the broader 
landscapes of international legal argument, ideological struggle, and geopolitical contestation my 
purpose is to generate further debate on the topic rather than offer a conclusive understanding of 
it. For important English-language contextualization of Soviet law, see e.g. SCOTT NEWTON, LAW 
AND THE MAKING OF THE SOVIET WORLD: THE RED DEMIURGE (2015); Franziska Exeler, The 
Ambivalent State: Determining Guilt in the Post-World War II Soviet Union, 75 SLAVIC REV. 
606 (2016);  Michelle Jean Penn, The Extermination of Peaceful Soviet Citizens: Aron Trainin 
and International Criminal Law (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Colorado, 
Boulder) (on file with author); Franziska Exeler, Nazi Atrocities, International Criminal Law, and 
War Crimes Trials: The Soviet Union and the Global Moment of Post-World War II Justice, in 
THE NEW HISTORIES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: RETRIALS 189 (Immi Tallgren & 
Thomas Skouteris, eds., 2019); Boyd van Dijk, “The Great Humanitarian”: The Soviet Union, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 37 LAW &. 
HIST. REV. 209 (2019).  
47
 OONA HATHAWAY & SCOTT SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: AND THEIR PLAN TO 
OUTLAW WAR (2017). 
48
 According to one prominent reviewer: “Like much other recent work, it highlights the symbiosis 
of central European Jewish and Anglo-American legal traditions in the making of this order. The 
Bolshevik role, which was not insignificant, especially in the 1930s, remains unsung, perhaps 
because it would complicate what can all too easily read like a story of virtue triumphant.” Mark 
Mazower, The Internationalists by Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro Review – The Plan to 
Outlaw War, The Guardian (December 16, 2017) (available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2017/dec/16/the-internationalists-review-plan-outlaw-
war?CMP=share_btn_tw) (last accessed March 31, 2019). However, it should be noted that the 
central European Jewish experience, which is only just beginning to be comprehensively 
accounted for in international legal scholarship (see e.g., REUT YAEL PAZ, A GATEWAY 
BETWEEN A DISTANT GOD AND A CRUEL WORLD: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF JEWISH GERMAN-
14 UNBOUND Vol. 12:1, 2019 
 
provides a profound opportunity to analytically incorporate the many critical insights 
highlighted by responses to The Internationalists. Given this work’s prominent authors, 
extensive promotion, high degree of contemporary relevance, and bold claims across a 
number of disciplines, it has elicited a vast array of reviews in both popular and academic 
publications.
49
 While many are premised on the view that law is impotent in the face of 
raw power,
50
 others have subjected this work to critique from the left by highlighting how 
Hathaway and Shapiro’s narrow conception of war and peace leads them to venerate 
institutions of free trade, economic sanctions, and U.S. hegemony that are complicit in 
 
SPEAKING SCHOLARS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012); JAMES LOEFFLER, ROOTED 
COSMOPOLITANS: JEWS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2018); THE LAW 
OF STRANGERS: JEWISH LAWYERS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
(James Loeffler & Moria Paz, eds., forthcoming)), was not mutually exclusive with the Soviet 
project. This is especially true when considering how the Soviet jurist and leading theorist of the 
crime of aggression (see infra Part III.B.) was very much a product of Eurasian borderlands Jewish 
background. See Penn, supra note 52, at 37-53; Through its inclusion of Trainin (articulator of 
‘Crimes Against Peace’), alongside fellow central European Jewish jurists Hersch Lauterpacht 
(articulator of ‘Crimes Against Humanity’) and Raphael Lemkin (articulator of ‘Genocide’), 
Penn’s analysis provides an indispensable expansion of Philippe Sands’s recent influential 
account of the origins of international criminal law that only deals with the latter two theorists and 
crimes. See generally, PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET: ON THE ORIGINS OF GENOCIDE 
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (2016).   
49
 While not an exhaustive compilation, see e.g. Mazower, supra note 53; Margaret MacMillian, 
The Internationalists by Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro – Law and Peace, Financial Times 
(September 1, 2017) (available at https://www.ft.com/content/9e4191c6-8db5-11e7-9580-
c651950d3672) (last accessed March 31, 2019); Louis Menand, What Happens When War is 
Outlawed?, The New Yorker, (September 18, 2017) 
(https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/what-happens-when-war-is-outlawed) (last 
accessed March 31, 2019); Richard Aldous, Gentlemen, Let’s Not Fight, Wall Street Journal 
(September 25, 2017) (https://www.wsj.com/articles/gentlemen-lets-not-fight-1506382095) (last 
accessed March 31, 2019); Michael Glennon, How Not to End War, Lawfare (October 18, 2017) 
(https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-not-end-war) (last accessed March 31, 2019); James Juhnke, 
Book Review: ‘The Internationalists’, Mennonite World Review (December 18, 2017) (available 
at http://mennoworld.org/2017/12/18/columns/book-review-the-internationalists/) (last accessed 
March 31, 2019); Isabel Hull, Anything Can Be Rescinded: When can you start a war? 40 
LONDON REV. BOOKS 25 (2018); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Internationalists: How a Radical 
Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World by Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, 32 ETHICS 
& INT’L AFF. 255 (2018); Arthur Ripstein, Review of Oona A. Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The 
Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World, 13 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 
205 (2018); Peter Yearwood, Review of The Internationalists: And Their Plan to Outlaw War, 
Reviews in History (June, 2018) (available at https://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/2257) (last 
accessed March 31, 2019); Agora: The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War 
Remade the World, 7 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 295 (2018) (special issue featuring  reviews 
from Oliver Diggelman, Tarak Barkawi, Andreas Follesdal, Anna Geis, Paolo Palchetti, and Geir 
Ulfstein as well as responses from Hathaway and Shapiro). 
50
 On author’s response to these criticisms, see Oona Hathaway & Scott Shapiro, The 
Internationalists vs. the Realists and Neocons, Lawfare, (September 25, 2017) (available at: 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/internationalists-vs-realists-and-neocons) (last visited March 31, 
2019). 
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the very violence the authors purport to oppose.
51
 Thus, engaging The Internationalists 
and its reviews as a meta-phenomenon bridges the gap between this article’s historical 
point that the Soviet Union is key to understanding the crime of aggression and its 
normative political point that contemporary international criminal justice must be 
understood through a Marxist lens.            
Moving forward from these premises, Part II contextualizes the Soviet approach to 
aggression by exploring the promises and contradictions presented by the interwar 
campaign to outlaw war. Through critical engagement with The Internationalists, I center 
the largely absent consideration of the imperial backdrop that shaped the project to 
outlaw war. This opens a space for exploring Vladimir Lenin’s critical and strategic 
analyses of empire/inter-imperial rivalry in relation to the proclaimed ends of the 
outlawry campaign. Following this, Part III examines Soviet contributions to the 
development of the crime of aggression contextualized through Soviet encounters with 
the international legal order. These ranged from early recognition controversies to its 
experience of cataclysmic violence during the Second World War to its emergence as a 
triumphant would-be architect of a new world order. Here, through a reading of key texts 
by Trainin and Korovin, I depict the Soviet vision of criminalizing aggressive war as 
actively requiring an emancipatory re-imagination of the global system where the success 
of juridical innovations could not be separated from achieving their material conditions 
of possibility.  
Finally, Part IV examines the contradictions revealed within the Soviets’ project of 
criminalizing aggression as the Cold War and decolonization took center stage in world 
politics. Here, I analyze these contradictions in relation to the Soviets’ frustrated attempt 
to, on the one hand, further a world revolution aimed at transcending the state by 
achieving communism and, on the other hand, employing draconian measures to ensure 
the survival of the Soviet state as a necessary means of bringing forth its world 
revolutionary ends. By navigating this chasm through the contradictory principles relating 
to its commitment to criminalizing aggressive war, the Soviets opened themselves to 
numerous challenges from a wide variety of actors with very different agendas and 
ideologies. In concluding, I touch upon contemporary developments aimed at 
fundamentally re-imagining the crime of aggression as a means of showing why lessons 
derived from the Soviets’ formative visions are still important today.    
 
II. Lineages of War’s Outlawry: Context, Contradiction, Critique  
 




 See Nicholas Mulder, The Rise and Fall of Euro-American Inter-State War, 10 HUMANITY 133 
(2019); Charlotte Peevers, Liberal Internationalism, Radical Transformation and the Making of 
World Orders, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 303 (2018); Tarak Barkawi, From Law to History: The Politics 
of War and Empire, 7 GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 315 (2018); Stephen Wertheim, The War 
Against War, The Nation (November 8, 2018) (available at 
https://www.thenation.com/article/liberal-internationalism-paris-peace-pact/) (last accessed March 
31, 2019). 
16 UNBOUND Vol. 12:1, 2019 
 
The crime of aggression is unique among international crimes. After all, prior to 
Nuremberg, while trying individuals for breaching the rules of conduct during war was a 
recognized practice, a sovereign’s justification for waging war against an outsider was 
traditionally assumed to be beyond the scope of legal accountability.
52
 Yet as a matter of 
historical context, a larger campaign to outlaw war existed in the interwar period that 
witnessed not only vast transformations of international law
53
 but the rise of the modern 
idea of ‘international society’ as we know it.54 The enduring legal impact of this war 
outlawry movement attained a high degree of prominence when Nazi defendants at 
Nuremberg sought to challenge the legitimacy of the proceedings against them on the 
grounds that they were being retroactively charged for acts that were not criminal offenses 
at the time of their commission.
55
 The prosecution responded to this challenge, in part, 
by invoking the 1928 Paris Peace Pact (as commonly referred to as the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact) as evidence that the illegality of the Nazis’ behavior was well-established when it 
occurred.
56
 As they argued, once this initial peace agreement between the U.S. and 
France was opened to all states as a multilateral renunciation of aggression and conquest 
as national policy options, it eventually acquired sixty-three signatures (including 
Germany’s), thus revealing an international consensus on the unlawful character of war.57                
When considering the Allies’ overall legal strategy at Nuremberg, finding a basis for 
proclaiming aggressive war as a crime that the Germans were uniquely guilty of was a 
crucial task.
58
 By condemning the Nazis for starting the war, and subsequently declaring 
them liable for their hostilities conduct violations as foreseeable consequences of war, 
the Allies could exonerate themselves for their own wartime breaches.
59
 The pressure to 
resolve this conundrum provides context for the Nuremberg Judgment’s iconic 
pronouncement that: “[t]o initiate a war of aggression…is not only an international crime; 
it is the supreme international crime differing from the other war crimes in that it contains 
within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”60 However, this raised the question of 
 
52
 GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR AND CRIME: WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE REINVENTION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (2007); For a compilation of pre-Nuremberg practice regarding war 
crimes trials see generally Willard Cowles, Trials of War Criminals (Non-Nuremberg), 42 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 299 (1948). 
53
 On the transformation of existing global sensibilities through the unprecedented merger of 
international law with international institutionalism see David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 
8 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 842-844 (1987). 
54
 See DANIEL GORMAN, THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IN THE 1920S 3-8 
(2012).  
55
 On these issues of retroactivity from perspective of a Nuremberg defense lawyer, see Otto 
Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterwards, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 336-340 (1965).  
56
 On the Tribunal’s reliance on these arguments in its finding of guilt, see International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences (October 1, 1946), 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 216-
218 (1947). 
57
 Id., at 217.  
58
 Franz Schick, Crimes Against Peace, 38 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 445, 448-449 (1948). 
59
 Bernard Meltzer, A Note on Some Aspects of the Nuremberg Debate, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 455, 
469 (1947); For a theory of how the International Military Tribunal may have realistically 
addressed the issue of alleged crimes committed by the Allies see David Luban, The Legacies of 
Nuremberg, 54 SOC. RES. 779, 810-812 (1987). 
60
 International Military Tribunal, supra note 62, at 186. 
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whether the Paris Peace Pact was a sufficient basis for justifying the radical move to 
criminally prosecute individual state actors for behavior they would have otherwise been 
exempt from under the traditional logic of sovereign immunity. In responding to this, a 
longstanding view of the Pact is that it represented an idealistic, but utterly ineffectual, 
attempt to subvert power politics to law and this was made abundantly evident by its 
failure to prevent the Second World War.
61
 That said, presenting a case that placed such 
great emphasis on a deeply questionable source of legal authority to justify a massive 
rupture of existing sensibilities certainly provides ammunition for those who would 
dismiss Nuremberg as ‘Victor’s Justice.’62               
However, Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro comprehensively challenge these 
widespread perceptions of the Paris Peace Pact in their recent book, The 
Internationalists. For Hathaway and Shapiro, despite much instinctive cynicism, the Pact 
was nothing short of a turning point between the ‘Old World Order’ where war and 
conquest were essential to guaranteeing order in international relations and our current 
‘New World Order,’ where the legitimate use of military force is deeply circumscribed, 
conquest is anathema, and innovative regimes of sanctions exist to enforce standards and 
obligations as an alternative to war.
63
 This catalyzed a cascade of juridical innovations 
using the Pact as a novel basis for condemning deployments of military force and seizures 
of territory that were once routinely accepted practices in international relations.
64
 The 
interwar U.S. Stimpson Doctrine marked this shift by invoking the Pact’s delegitimation 
of aggression as grounds for refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the 1931 Japanese 
conquest of Manchuria and 1935 Italian invasion of the Abyssinian Empire (Ethiopia), 
despite the fact that third-party condemnation and sanctions traditionally meant 
jeopardizing neutrality status.
65
 Once the Second World War was underway, this 
organizing framework of anti-aggression formed the Anglo-American commitment to 
ideological pluralism and the disavowal of any plans for postwar territorial 
aggrandizement via the 1941 Atlantic Charter.
66
 These understandings were later codified 
 
61
 Here Hans Morgenthau, widely acknowledged as the founding father of the Realist school of 
International Relations, presented a negative view of the Pact emblematic of an emerging critique 
of legal formalism that remains a highly influential source of contemporary skepticism regarding 
law’s ability to prevent war, see OLIVER JÜTERSONKE, MORGENTHAU, LAW AND REALISM 177 
(2010); On the nature of criminal liability for aggression as a defining point of contention between 
diverging Realist and legalist conceptions of the international order that became prominent during 
the postwar era see generally Jochen von Bernstroff, Peace and Global Justice through 
Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression? Kelsen and Morgenthau on the Nuremberg Trials and 
International Judicial Function, in HANS KELSEN IN AMERICA – SELECTIVE AFFINITIES AND THE 
AFFINITIES OF ACADEMIC INFLUENCE 85 (Jacob Talmon, ed., 2016).  
62
 See DANILO ZOLO, VICTOR’S JUSTICE: FROM NUREMBERG TO THE HAGUE 140-142 (M.W. 
Weir, trans. 2009). 
63
 In framing this argument in anticipation of reflexive dismissals, they claim that “[o]utlawing war 
only seems ridiculous to us because ours is a world in which war has already been outlawed.” 
HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at xiv. 
64
 Accordingly, the Pact should not be dismissed for failing to immediately transform world order 
upon its signature given that “[l]egal revolutions do not end with the passing of a law. They begin 
with them.” Id., at 331. 
65
 See Id., at 238-240. 
66
 Id., at 189-191. 
18 UNBOUND Vol. 12:1, 2019 
 
in the Principles and Purposes section of the Charter of United Nations, thus forming 
the very basis for the postwar world order.
67
                 
It is in this context that Hathaway and Shapiro provide an elaborate behind-the-scenes 
exploration of Nuremberg’s unprecedented imposition of criminal liability on state 
actors for planning and waging aggressive war. In doing so, they show how the Nuremberg 
Judgment itself did not do justice to the monumental theoretical efforts involving some 
the world’s greatest legal intellects who sought to articulate a doctrinally sound basis for 
the crime of aggression.
68
 This included the observation by Bohuslav Ecer and William 
Chandler that, rather than aggression constituting a new criminal offense per se, the 
outlawry of war merely stripped aggressors of their sovereign immunity thus rendering 
acts of killing in furtherance of an unjustifiable war legally indistinguishable from 
murder.
69
 However, as Hans Kelsen pointed out, given international law’s imposition of 
collective as opposed to individual responsibility, the logical conclusion of this approach 
was that it made every German a potential defendant; thus, an essential move for ensuring 
the legitimacy of this new undertaking was to restrict the scope of liability to high-ranking 
Nazi figures.
70
 Yet, perhaps the most profound moment came during the proceedings 
against General Alfred Jodl where the prosecution, in the form of Sir Hartley Shawcross, 
and the defense, in the form of Hermann Jahrreiss, engaged in an act of ‘courtroom 
ventriloquism’ whereby both lawyers served as direct argumentative proxies for two of 
the most influential international legal theorists of all time, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and 
Carl Schmitt, respectively.
71
 According to this account, argument over the status of the 
Paris Peace Pact was nothing short of an epic showdown between a Jewish proponent of 
building a world where the judgment of war is legally actionable (Lauterpacht) and a Nazi 




However, while Hathaway and Shapiro’s account enriches our understanding of the 
crime of aggression as it was situated within the larger movement to outlaw war, their 
study omits the generative role of the Soviet Union in this context.
73
 This can largely be 
viewed as a consequence of the Hathaway and Shapiro’s fetishization of the Pact (and 
the isolated agency of its architects).
74
 On this basis, their study fails to account for the 
influence of broader movements that viewed the outlawry of war not simply as a narrow 
matter of legality, but as inseparable from the need to dismantle the entire ‘war system’ 
that linked fanatical nationalism, militaristic imperialism, and armaments manufacture-
 
67
 Id., at 330-331. 
68
 Id., at 290-291. 
69
 Id., at 252-254, 259-260; For the text of and commentary on Chandler’s contribution see 
Jonathan Bush, The Supreme…Crime and Its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime 
of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2324 (2002). 
70
 HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at 269-271. 
71
 Id., at 288. 
72
 Id., at 288-290. 
73
 The Soviet Union is by no means the only exclusion made by this work. On neglected role of 
the Third World in shaping the ‘New World Order’ Hathaway and Shapiro ascribe to the Pact, 
see generally Barkawi, supra note 57. 
74
 Id., at 316. 




 That said, to what extent did Soviet efforts, guided by this impetus of 
exporting revolutionary transformation on a global scale, substantively contribute to the 
profound innovation of imposing individual liability for aggression in a manner 
unrepresented by the text of the Nuremberg judgment? Although Hathaway and Shapiro 
briefly mention the Soviet jurist Aron Trainin who developed a basis for individually 
criminalizing aggression, Soviet insights are excluded, absent a condemnatory dismissal 
of Stalin for employing show trials and generally using law as a legitimizing veneer for 
political ends.
76
 In doing so, they seemingly depict all Soviet jurists as pure extensions of 
Stalin’s will, thereby affirming a simplistic binary between law and politics occluding how 
Soviet engagement with the law-politics relationship stemmed from elaborate projects of 
materialist jurisprudence that could be creatively deployed even in the shadow of Stalin. 
If there is even a small degree of truth to this assertion, then fears of Stalinist repression 
makes Soviet jurists all the more worthy of attention given their ability to produce 
impressive legal innovations under extreme pressure.  
Unfortunately, this characterization is indicative of Hathaway and Shapiro’s general 
depiction of the Soviet Union as a cold, calculating actor, as opposed to a producer of 
any theoretical innovations regarding the status of aggression under international law. As 
such, it ignores the Soviets’ active role in seeking to explicitly fulfill the Pact by advancing 
a definition of aggression that directly confronted numerous concerns among states that 
feared to be on the receiving end of military force during the interwar period. In a 
manner anticipating international legal debates that would become prominent in the 
postwar context, this definition affixed the label of aggression to potential actions taken 
 
75
 Peevers, supra note 57, at 309 (2018); On additional historical details relevant to the decline of 
interstate war excluded by The Internationalists, see e.g. Mulder, supra note 57; Hull, supra note 
55; However, despite these contextual historicist critiques, The Internationalists nonetheless 
forms a quintessential case study in the method of ‘juridical thinking’ whereby contextual rigidity 
is a second-order consideration in relation to the primary task of weaving together diverse strands 
of meaning for the purpose of declaring the existence of a transcendent principle. Orford, supra 
note 51, at 172 (“[A]s lawyers, particularly those of us with common law backgrounds, we are 
trained in the art of making meaning move across time.”). Thus for Hathaway and Shapiro, the 
strands that were the Pact, the Simpson Doctrine, the Atlantic Charter, the UN Charter, the 
Nuremberg Judgment, and the subsequent state practice determined via the Correlates of War 
project (see Oona Hathaway & Scott Shapiro, “Conquest and State Size Database,” (available at 
http://theinternationalistsbook.com/data.html#data-extended) (last accessed July 10, 2018)) are 
woven together construct the principle that is the ban on war. However, given that there exists no 
universally-accepted template for what to include or exclude from such a narrative, expounding 
upon the development of a juridical principle can always be contested or further expanded. See 
Koskenniemi, supra note 52, at 970 (“What we study as history of international law depends on 
what we think international law is the first place.”); see also John Haskell, The Choice of Subject 
in Writing Histories of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A PROFESSION (Jean 
d’Aspremont, Tarcisio Gazzini, Andre Nolkaemper, & Wouter Werner, eds. 2017).       
76
 Here Stalin is depicted as not caring “whether crimes against peace were actual crimes under 
international law.” HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at 257. 
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against a state’s “internal position”77  as well as a state’s “international conduct.”78 Such a 
deficiency is at odds with Hathaway and Shapiro's general argument that radical ideas, 
and not simply crude Realpolitik, are essential when explaining how war came to be 
outlawed.
79
 However, a more nuanced characterization has been presented by Kirsten 
Sellars, who shows that crimes against peace developed “not as any single national 
monologue, but as an intermittent international dialogue involving jurists in the Soviet 
Union, Britain and the United States, as well as those attached to the European 
governments-in-exile.”80 Yet, before actually detailing the substantive Soviet theories on 
this point, an alternative interpretation of the world order transformation that Hathaway 
and Shapiro ascribe to the Paris Peace Pact reveals why understanding the Soviet 
perspective on the crime of aggression matters.
81
 
              
B. The Conundrum of Imperial Anti-Aggression 
 
In explaining the successful outlawry of war, The Internationalists advances the view 
that law should be understood as realigning state behavior in a manner that deeply 
resonates with Constructivist theories of International Relations (‘IR’) emphasizing 
actors’ imaginative agency when building international norms.82 Considering Hathaway 
 
77That is, “its political, economic, or social structure; alleged shortcomings of its administration; 
disorder following upon strikes revolutionary, or counter-revolutionary movements, and civil 
wars…” Convention Defining Aggression (Between Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, 
Rumania, Turkey and the U.S.S.R.), 27 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 192, 194 (1933) 
78
 I.e.: “infringement or a threat of infringing the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign 
state or its citizens; rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; measures of economic or 
financial boycott; conflicts in the sphere of economic, financial or other obligations in connection 
with foreign governments…” Id. (For a watershed commitment to many of these ideals nearly forty 
years later see G.A. Res. 2625 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, U.N. GAOR, 25th sess., U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970)); For a compilation of interwar era 
Soviet anti-aggression efforts, see MAXIM LITVINOV, AGAINST AGGRESSION: SPEECHES BY 
MAXIM LITVINOV, TOGETHER WITH TEXTS OF TREATIES AND OF THE COVENANT OF THE 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1939.)  
79
 However, The Internationalists is not unique in making this exclusion on the basis of perceived 
Soviet-Western difference when it comes to explain the imposition of criminal liability for waging 
war. See KIRSTEN SELLARS, ‘CRIMES AGAINST PEACE’ AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (2013) 
(Footnote 13 details previous studies of the origins of the ‘crimes against peace’ that depict it as a 
Western liberal project fundamentally opposed to what the Soviets’ stood for, thus, entrenching 
a deep skepticism over the possibility of Soviet influence). 
80
 Id. (emphasis in original). 
81
 It should be noted that offering this alternative is to not categorically dismiss the Pact and its 
impact. Rather, while Hathaway and Shapiro view the Pact as a cause in and of itself, my claim is 
that it is better understood as an effect of larger global forces. 
82
 I credit Tristan Webb with this observation of The Internationalists as a Constructivist work; 
For a broader analysis of this interplay see generally Jutta Brunnee and Stephen Toope, 
International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law, 
39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 19 (2000); On their subsequent confrontation of the 
Constructivism paradigm in relation to their work see Oona Hathway & Scott Shapiro, 
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and Shapiro’s U.S. context, the embrace of this orientation is highly understandable. 
After all, in the wake of the post-9/11 ‘War on Terror,’ arguments based on structuralist 
rational choice/game theory models that justify international legal breaches on this basis 
have become vastly influential within the U.S. academy, judiciary, and general legal 
culture.
83
 However, like most theories of international law and IR, Hathaway and 
Shapiro, along with the vast majority of their critics, base their analysis on the 
presumption of a horizontal world of sovereign states.
84
 As a result, only secondary 
emphasis is placed on the vertical hierarchies of empires and their colonies that have 
existed for most of history and have defined the modern world as we know it.
85
 However, 
questions surrounding empire following the First World War were central to structuring 
the debates on the outlawry of war.           
For Hathaway and Shapiro, once the Peace Pact provided a condemnation of 
aggression, there remained the question of what constituted legitimate self-defense. 
While they show how Salmon Levinson, the American lawyer occupying a leading 
position in the outlawry movement, opposed including any reference to self-defense due 
to its supposedly obvious status as an inherent right, the scope of self-defense in the 
imperial context was anything but obvious.
86
 For instance, Austen Chamberlain, the UK’s 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, asserted a right of self-defense covering not only 
Britain’s “own territory and her Empire, but also over unnamed ‘certain regions’ outside 
it.”87 Moreover, under this view, “defensive actions could be triggered not just by war but 
also by actions short of war,” and “[b]y this reasoning, defensive actions could be 
mounted not just against all-out armed attack but also against rather less forceful actions 
such as ‘questioning’ and ‘interference.’”88 For the American commentator and Pact 
opponent Edwin Borchard, this British view exceeded even the Monroe Doctrine where 
at least the geographic scope of the U.S.’s asserted sphere of influence was well 
 
International Law and Its Transformation through the Outlawry of War, 95 INT’L AFFAIRS 45, 
46 (2019). 
83
 For studies of this multifaceted project of American conservative opposition to international 
legal constraints see e.g. Alejandro Lorite-Escorihuela,  Cultural Relativism the American Way: 
The Nationalist School of International Law in the United States, 5 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 
1 (2005); Emily Haslam & Wade Mansell, John Bolton and the US Retreat from International 
Law, 14 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 459 (2005); JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE ASSAULT ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015). 
84
 For a display of this common presumption through a response to their critics, see Hathaway & 
Shapiro, supra note 55. 
85
 On Emer de Vattel’s 1758 treatise The Law of Nations as the original framework for state-
centrism in modern theories of both international law and International Relations see Jennifer 
Pitts, International Relations and the Critical History of International Law, 31 INT’L RELATIONS 
282, 285-89 (2017); On Vattel’s theories of sovereign equality as a natural law counterfactual based 
on individual self-defense abstracted from the hierarchical realities of his actual historical context, 
see Peter Stirk, The Westphalian Model and Sovereign Equality, 38 REV. INT’L STUD. 641, 648 
(2011); For an in-depth study of Vattel’s context see JENNIFER PITTS, BOUNDARIES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL: LAW AND EMPIRE 68-91 (2018). 
86
 On Levinson’s evasion of self-defense, see HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at 123. 
87
 SELLARS, supra note 85, at 29. 
88
 Id., at 30 (emphasis in original). 




 Such a critique reveals contention over the kinds of unequal power relations 
exposed through international legal projects seeking to regulate the use of force. The 
early-twentieth-century U.S. construction of a legalistic foreign policy prone to 
rhetorically invoking the principle of sovereign equality as an axiomatic presumption 
meant to declare moral superiority relative to the European empires emblematizes such 
a project.
90
 However, in actual practice, these egalitarian aspirations (whether sincere or 
otherwise) were subordinated to hierarchical justifications when the protection of key 
economic interests justified coercive interventions in the affairs of weaker states.
91
 
Additionally, these challenges occurred alongside major changes within the colonial 
order via the League of Nations Mandate system whereby former German and Ottoman 
possessions were placed under the internationally-supervised trusteeship of victorious 
powers tasked with raising these areas to the requisite level of ‘civilization’ in preparation 
 
89
 Id.; see Edwin Borchard, The Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 23 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 116, 118 (1929). 
90
 For the leading historical study see generally BENJAMIN COATES, LEGALIST EMPIRE: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (2016); Additionally, it is worth noting that while the U.S. did possess a formal empire, 
it was justified as a peaceful, humanitarian enterprise where instances of acquiring territory 
through force (namely the Mexican-American and Spanish-American Wars) were rare 
exceptions. See Pitman Potter, The Nature of American Territorial Expansion, 15 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 189, 192-194 (1921); However, this narrative of imperial virtue/exceptionalism has all too 
frequently been taken at face value and it is only now that studies of American expansion in its 
broader world-historical contexts are being produced. See e.g. A.G. HOPKINS, THE AMERICAN 
EMPIRE: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2018); see also DANIEL IMMERWAHR, HOW TO HIDE AN 
EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE GREATER UNITED STATES (2019).  
91
 The great case in point here was the Monroe Doctrine which frequently raised questions as to 
how the interventions it justified might be preserved if sovereign equality was truly embraced. See 
Stephen Wertheim, The League of Nations: A Retreat from International Law?, 7 J. GLOBAL 
HIST, 210, 217, 229 (2012); Such frustrations were tied to an American view that the Monroe 
Doctrine was a non-legal foreign policy instrument and this was actively contested by Latin 
American actors who asserted that it formed the basis of obligation within a distinctly Pan-
American juridical order. See generally Juan Pablo Scarfi, In the Name of the Americas: The 
Pan-American Redefinition of the Monroe Doctrine and the Emerging Language of American 
International Law in the Western Hemisphere, 1898-1933, 40 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 189 (2016); 
This structure of presumed formal equality coupled with exceptional de facto hierarchy 
continually reproduced itself throughout the twentieth-/twenty-first century American foreign 
relations from post-First World War Wilsonian ‘self-determination’ (see e.g. ADOM GETACHEW, 
WORLDMAKING AFTER EMPIRE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SELF-DETERMINATION 37-70 (2019)) 
to Cold War ‘modernization’ (see e.g. NILS GILMAN, MANDARINS OF THE FUTURE: 
MODERNIZATION THEORY IN COLD WAR AMERICA (2007)) to the ongoing ‘War on Terror’ 
(see e.g. MICHAEL MANN, INCOHERENT EMPIRE (2005)). For a theory of a uniquely American 
view of superiority that allows these justifications to be constructed time and time again, see 
generally Taesuh Cha, The Formation of American Exceptional Identities: A Three-Tier Model 
of the ‘Standard of Civilization’ in US Foreign Policy, 21 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 743 (2015); For a 
broader theory of how sovereign equality is itself a problem in that legitimizes a system where 
formally equal interactions and exchange are foundationally premised on inherently coercive 
structures, see MIEVILLE, supra note 34, at 117-151. 




 Although the technical scope of this system covered only a limited 
range of cases compared to the world’s aggregate mass of colonized spaces, it nonetheless 
“made a crucial change to the structure of international political and legal order by 
introducing a new form of global regulation to govern the practice of colonialism, 
essentially making the promotion of civilization a concern of international society as a 
whole, rather than exclusively the responsibility of the relevant imperial power.”93 While 
this turn to trusteeship has long been viewed as a compromise between traditional great 
power realpolitik and the type of moralistic internationalist idealism promoted by the 
likes of Woodrow Wilson, this view obscures the deep systemic logic that intertwined 
these two approaches.
94
 As Alexander Anievas has shown, the Wilsonian strategy 
influencing projects such as the Mandate system was rooted in the attempt to transcend 
the constraints of formal empire while simultaneously preserving racial hierarchies and 
opportunities for capital accumulation while justifying the interventions needed to 
preserve these practices.
95
 Thus, while the Mandate system is often understood by critical 
international legal scholars as a paternalistic order distinct from the League’s ambition of 
outlawing aggression among European states, the projects both of trusteeship and anti-
aggression were intertwined within a larger comprehensive system of inter-imperial 
geopolitics.
96
      
Thus, when evaluating the attempt to outlaw aggression and conquest, the 1928 Paris 
Peace Pact was arguably prompted by preserving the territorial status quo just as much, 
if not more, than any attempt to eliminate the human suffering that results from war. In 
identifying this motivation, Nicholas Mulder incisively has observed that the finalization 
of the Pact occurred at a moment of global economic crisis and a striking historical 
parallel can be located in 1873 when a roughly analogous economic downturn produced 
a massive spike in states’ drives to accumulate new territories.97 Hathaway and Shapiro, 
however, do acknowledge these material constraints on legal idealism, noting the 
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 The Covenant of the League of Nations, at Art. 22, (available at: 
www.avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art22 (last accessed 9 February 2018); For a 
comprehensive history of this system see generally SUSAN PEDERSEN, THE GUARDIANS: THE 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE CRISIS OF EMPIRE (2015).  
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 EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: GROTIUS, COLONIALISM AND ORDER 
IN WORLD POLITICS 126 (2002). 
94
 ALEXANDER ANIEVAS, CAPITAL, THE STATE, AND WAR: CLASS CONFLICT AND GEOPOLITICS 
IN THE THIRTY YEARS’ CRISIS, 1914-1945 114-115 (2014). 
95
 Id., at 121-126; On Wilson’s influence in the formation of the Mandate system see PEDERSEN, 
supra note 85, at 23-28; see also Sushil Chandra Sinha, Role of President Woodrow Wilson in 
the Evolution of the Mandate System, 3 INDIAN J. POL. SCI. 424 (1942). 
96
 For a highly influential formulation of this ‘dual order’ during the interwar period, see Antony 
Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the 
Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 513, 580 (2002); On the 
need to account for larger geopolitical structures in order to avoid reductionist explanations based 
on racial/cultural difference within international legal discourse see Robert Knox, Civilising 
Interventions? Race, War, and International Law, 26 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFFAIRS 111, 126 
(2013) (An account of the contemporary manifestations of this racialized dynamic of inter-
imperial rivalry in international law); Knox, Valuing Race?, supra note 34 (Placing this claim in its 
broader historical and theoretical context).  
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 Mulder, supra note 57, at 143-144. 
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hypocrisy charges asserted against outlawry proponents by geopolitical latecomers, 
including the future Axis powers, who missed out on the biggest colonial land grabs.
98
 
They also document similar charges concerning the danger of limitless brutality in 
messianic ‘discriminatory’ wars against ‘unjust’ adversaries asserted by individuals such 
as Carl Schmitt who viewed absolute sovereign prerogative as a natural limitation on war’s 
violence, at least as it applied among ‘civilized’ European nations.99 Yet, their uncritical 
fixation on these points of discontent draws too stark of a binary.
100
 After all, dividing 
opinion between those who championed the Pact in the name of building a world without 
war and those who opposed the Pact out of a desire to preserve the prerogative to wage 
war excludes the counterintuitive realities that manifested during this era.    
While it is easy in retrospect to view the Axis powers as unambiguous aggressors, this 
should not conceal how, in the lead up to the Second World War, these states 
strategically lodged arguments invoking ‘anti-aggression.’ Such rhetoric exposed the 
tensions of an international legal order where progressive commitments remained 
marred by capitalist imperialism. In other words, far from delivering linear progress, the 
discourse surrounding the outlawry of war was itself complicit in plunging the world into 
war for a second time.
101
 For instance, the commonplace assumption that the 1935 Italian 
invasion of Ethiopia resulted from the League’s institutional failure conceals the reality 
that Italy explicitly lodged arguments that its intervention was warranted under 
international law due to Ethiopia’s violation of the conditional terms of its inclusion as a 
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 See HATHAWAY & SHAPIRO, supra note 53, at 219-223; On Schmitt’s framing of this evolution 
of limited war with the decline of the classical doctrine of just war theory see CARL SCHMITT, THE 
NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 155-
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100
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 One figure from this era who recognized the paradoxical function of anti-aggression rhetoric 
within the geopolitical rivalries of great powers was the feminist peace activist Helena Swanwick, 
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pacifist bag for which they profess so much contempt. 
HELENA SWANWICK, COLLECTIVE INSECURITY 111 (1937).  




 This reveals the way in which such conditions were uniquely imposed 
on Ethiopia, despite its status as a sovereign equal, in a deeply racialized manner 
reflecting the exclusionist conceptions of ‘civilization’ that still justified colonial rule 
under international law.
103
   
Thus, the fact that racial hierarchies overcame formal sovereignty compromised 
attempts to condemn Italy while exposing how international law remained fundamentally 
committed to imperial domination despite its newfound embrace of progressive 
discourse.
104
 This cast doubt on the universality of the outlawry campaign’s animating 
rhetoric.
105
 Moreover, these attitudes of racial/civilizational hierarchy provide context for 
Hathaway and Shapiro’s observation that the Japanese conquest of Manchuria was more 
thoroughly condemned than the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.
106
 This disparity highlights 
Japan’s precarious international status where, despite rapidly becoming an imperial great 
power, the race-based limits of its inclusion were starkly exposed.
107
 On this basis, the 
Japanese had little incentive to adhere to a progressive conception of international 
institutionalism that they would never be fully equal partners in shaping. Furthermore, 
there was the way in which the Nazis themselves utilized the new interwar international 
legal order to legitimize territorial aggrandizement while nonetheless invoking the 
language of non-aggression. This came in the form of invoking League commitments to 
minority rights to justify ‘peaceful’ territorial transfers to protect ethnic Germans in 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, and finally Danzig, where refusal to passively accede to this 
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which solidarity with Ethiopia amongst African diaspora communities throughout the world 
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INT’L STUD. 1131 (2013).  
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legitimized by the narrative that these territories would be granted meaningful sovereign 
autonomy. See e.g. Quincy Wright, Sovereignty of the Mandates, 17 AM. J. INT’L L. 691 (1923). 
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Shahabuddin, The ‘Standard of Civilisation’ in International Law: Intellectual Perspectives from 
Pre-War Japan, LEIDEN J. INT’L L 13, 22-31 (2018). 
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pattern of territorial accumulation triggered the invasion of Poland—thus setting off the 
Second World War.
108
    
 
C. Taking Lenin’s Theory of Imperialism Seriously 
 
In contrast, what made the Soviets unique in this context was their ability to offer 
sophisticated explanations of the contradictory interplay between aggression, imperialist 
ideology, and great power rivalries as they existed within a larger structure of political 
economy.
109
 Largely formulated before and during the First World War, this mode of 
identifying the inter-relationships that constituted the global system was highly relevant to 
the interwar period where the cessation of hostilities did not extinguish the war’s root 
causes. Vladimir Lenin’s 1916 work, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, for 
instance, asserted that the universalization of monopoly capitalism is structurally destined 
to result in endless wars of accumulation amongst rival empire-maintaining sovereign 
states who have no choice but to violently turn on one another once all the world’s 
territorial space is claimed.
110
 In synthesizing the insights of various Marxist and radical 
liberal thinkers, Lenin combined “economic analysis with a political analysis of class 
struggle within the various capitalist countries and their colonies, and on top of that 
display[ed] a grasp of the international military rivalry . . . thus integrating developments 
across a multiplicity of systems.”111 However, despite this centralizing focus on 
interconnection, Lenin’s theory of imperialism did not lead to a telos of global 
unification.
112
 Rather, he viewed the foundational multiplicity of sovereign states as the 
driver of this reality of global imperialism where economics and politics functioned as 
separate, yet intertwined, constitutive elements.
113
 From this perspective, attempts to end 
 
108
 See Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of Reconstruction, 13 YALE 
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war through the same order of international law that remained fundamentally committed 
to upholding state sovereignty, colonialism, and capital accumulation could hardly 
succeed on their own terms. After all, while the discourse surrounding the legitimate 
ends of conquest and imperialism may have changed, the underlying material conditions 
that rendered war an effective solution for certain issues arising within this system of 
social relations remained fundamentally intact.  
Following Lenin’s pre-war theory, one need only consider how the previously-
discussed interwar contradictions of imperial self-defense, internationalized paternalism, 
and reactionary appropriation provided endless pretexts for waging these inevitable wars 
of accumulation. Thus, in an effort to avoid these pitfalls, what Lenin provided was an 
alternative inter-systemic approach applicable to the questions of sovereignty and 
national independence that defined the interwar era. According to Lenin, the building of 
political forms capable of furthering the world revolution meant emulating the most 
modern nation-states that already existed in the West, making national independence a 
pressing priority.
114
 However, unlike the West’s hierarchical view whereby internationally-
supervised independence was appropriate for new nations in Central and Eastern 
Europe, yet potentially endless trusteeship was required outside Europe,
115
 the Soviet 
view actively called for the liberation of colonized peoples in Asia and Africa thus 
radically rejecting ‘civilization’ as a basis for sovereign independence.116 This move was 
fundamentally linked to the cause of emancipating the industrial labor force of the 
imperial metropole, for ending empire would cut off the ability of the metropolitan elite 
to continuously exploit surplus profits from their colonies and force them to directly face 
the demands of their unified domestic working classes.
117
 Moreover, this strategy was 
linked to the need to build class alliances between the workers of oppressed and 
oppressor nations; without this solidarity, alliances between the domestic workers and 
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their bourgeoisie within oppressor nations would continue the process of imperial 
exploitation unimpeded.
118
                    
Thus, for Lenin, national independence was not an end in and of itself, as he 
understood that formal sovereignty could still coexist alongside capitalist exploitation.
119
 
By linking these various factors in an inter-systemic capacity, Lenin’s radical strategy 
undermined arguments that characterized aggression and empire in a narrow fashion 
centered on discrete legal provisions aimed at achieving incremental progress. After all, 
according to this theoretical standpoint, empire was irreducible to any simple legal status 
for the actually-existing array of legal designations were themselves constructed through 
a world historic process of consolidating specific material relations of production whose 
cumulative effect could be deemed ‘imperialism’ (i.e. the highest stage of capitalism).120 




In applying this thinking to debates about interwar use of force, any delineation of 
aggression that invoked self-defense in the imperial context would be illegitimate because 
maintaining imperialism was illegitimate. Relatedly, any argument that rested on building 
a more humanitarian international order that adjusted legal provisions, but still presumed 
capitalist social relations, could be rejected as self-defeating in that superficial 
commitments would ultimately be rendered impotent by deeper systemic pathologies.
122
 
This provides context as to why jurists in the early Soviet Union were largely unconvinced 
that the internationalization of civilizational ethos via the formation of the League’s 
Mandate system represented any substantive transformation of an old imperial order 
based on domination, exploitation, and endless war.
123
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III. Criminalizing Aggression: The Soviet View 
 
A. International Law and Formative Soviet Engagement 
 
At first glance, the link between the Soviet critique of imperialism and Soviet efforts 
to criminalize war seems obvious. After all, if the wars waged by capitalist powers were 
illegitimate, then they should be banned, albeit in a capacity that eliminated the gaps, 
gray areas, and loopholes liberal condemnations of aggression strategically left open. 
However, this straightforward link is complicated if we consider just how radical the 
Soviets’ initial engagement with the question of ‘law’ actually was. According to leading 
Soviet jurist Evgeny Pashukanis, the ‘legal form’ was not a transhistorical reality but a 
feature of capitalist social relations, whereby materially-grounded actors were converted 
into abstract ‘legal persons’—a process that was necessary for legitimized formally-equal 
exchange within substantively unequal conditions.
124
  Thus, with the advent of the world 
revolution, the purpose was not to build new legal regimes, but to establish the material 
conditions that would cause law itself to ‘wither away.’125 Under this theory, condemning 
imperialist war in the name of law would have the contradictory effect of affirming the 
very juridical ordering that enabled capitalism and, by extension, imperialism. These 
formative premises, however, raise a question: why did the Soviets ultimately incorporate 
the criminalization of war into their anti-imperialist agenda if doing so contradicted their 
earlier commitments?  
The answer lies in the Soviet experience with the political contingency of international 
law, which can be indexed by the infinitely plastic concept of ‘lawfare’ invoked to evaluate 
the usage of law in the context of war.
126
 While designations of ‘lawfare’ as a recent 
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discourse abound in the ongoing ‘War on Terror’ as well as current animosities between 
Russia and the West,
127
 according to Christi Bartman, a major historical illustration can 
be found in the discourse of ‘aggression’ as it was applied by the Soviet Union in ways 
that continued into Russia’s Putin era.128 For Bartman, Soviet history reveals a clear and 
systematic pattern of ‘non-aggression pacts’ preceding coercive force beginning in 
Finland, Poland, and the Baltic States during the interwar period/onset of the Second 
World War, continuing in the Cold War through interventions in Warsaw Pact member 
states and Afghanistan, and surviving the Soviet collapse as shown by the Russian 
Federation’s approach to the Rome Statute.129             
In the words of Bartman, “the key to lawfare is its use in a manipulative or exploitative 
fashion” and, as such, does not extend to “[s]imply utilizing the international legal system 
to enforce valid laws.”130 However, determining what constitutes valid international law 
has long been critiqued as a deeply indeterminate and inherently political process.
131
 
Furthermore, given its construction at the intersection of highly contested issues of both 
the use of force and international criminal law, this issue of indeterminacy is especially 
true of attempts to criminalize aggression.
132
 Moreover, contextualizing how the Soviets 
approached the legality of aggression as a matter of strategic interest requires attention to 
how they theorized international law and, consequently, how their deepest pessimisms 
were confirmed by their formative engagements with the actually-existing international 
legal order.                
For the influential Soviet jurist Evgeny Pashukanis, international law is generated 
through competition between powerful capitalist states seeking to legitimize the pursuit 
of their interests through universal invocations that change in accordance with shifting 
patterns of accumulation.
133
 In observing how this general theory manifested at the level 
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of national experience, one need only consider the circumstances surrounding the 
international recognition of the Soviet Union. Here, the new Soviet regime that emerged 
in 1917 was subject to numerous recognition denials, with the US only explicitly 
expressing recognition in 1933.
134
 For many prominent Western scholars, this prolonged 
nonrecognition blatantly disregarded the longstanding principle that the international 
legal standing of a domestic government, even one that emerged through revolution, 
must be evaluated on the basis of objective, de facto territorial authority independent of 
the recognizers’ normative/ideological inclinations.135 While defenders of nonrecognition 
raised the issue of Soviet nonfulfillment of pre-existing international legal obligations, as 
leading international lawyer Hersh Lauterpacht later reflected, this stance rested on a 
problematic conflation of the willingness to fulfill obligations with the ability to fulfill 
them, and the Soviets were certainly ‘able.’136 Thus, while the inability may have warranted 




These manipulations revealed how Western proclamations of international law as an 
‘ideologically neutral’ body of rules were deeply political acts made all the more powerful 
by their very denial of political motives. Yet the Soviets hardly harbored a blind belief in 
international law’s ability to deliver fair, apolitical, and sufficiently determinate results. 
After all, they were well aware of the distinction between international legal recognition’s 
declarative theories (recognition as the acknowledgment of actually-existing international 
legal standing) and constitutive theories (international legal standing requires 
recognition).
138
 According to Pashukanis, declarative theories are “the reflection of the 
epoch, when the bourgeoisie struggled for national liberty and the formation of national 
states.”139 In Evgeny Korovin’s addendum to Pashukanis’s observation, “[o]n the other 
hand, the theories of constitutional [constitutive] recognition reflect the practice of the 
imperialistic policy of the greater powers.”140 Thus, the fact that the Western powers went 
out of their way to apply the imperialist constitutive theory is quite telling from a Soviet 
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perspective that was well aware of international law’s imperial affordances. This being 
the case, the great lesson for the Soviets in light of their early recognition controversies 
was that successful struggle against the capitalist world order could neither be waged 
through consistently rigid adherence to international legal formalism nor outright 
rejection of international law. Rather, a third option was to use the gaps and 
indeterminacies inherent within the international legal order to transmit their own 
alternative conceptions of law, sovereignty and the state that were ultimately bound to the 




B. Articulating the Material Deviance of Aggressive War 
 
To understand the Soviet conceptualization of the crime of aggression in this context, 
one must consider the relationship between international law and the Soviet experience 
of the Second World War. This is especially important considering how it was the 
unprecedented degree of violence unleashed by the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union 
that solidified the previously controversial decision to subject this violence to postwar 
adjudication as expressed through the 1943 Moscow Declarations.
142
 Yet this is 
inseparably linked to the question of why this violence reached such an extraordinary 
level. The Nazi position insisted that legal constraints on the conduct of hostilities were 
entirely inapplicable to the war on the Eastern Front.
143
 This, considered in conjunction 
with the Soviet Union’s complex relationship with the politics of international legal 
legitimacy, provides context for their extensive and meticulous documenting of Nazi 
breaches of laws of war.
144
 In this capacity, the Soviets affirmed traditional rules while also 
introducing many of their own innovations, particularly principles relating to the 
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legitimacy and international legal status of guerrilla/partisan warfare.
145
 Thus, when the 
war ended and the question of what do about the Third Reich’s military and political 
leadership became unavoidable, the Soviet approach compensated for many of the 
Western Allies’ gaps in legal sensibilities when it came to implementing the novelties that 
made the Nuremberg trial possible.            
On one level, there were issues concerning group criminality and the retroactive 
application of criminal law that the Soviets had comparatively fewer anxieties about 
creatively redefining.
146
 After all, many in the Soviet Union viewed Nuremberg as a 
continuation of Stalin’s infamous show trials.147 However, while these contributions 
certainly affirm the Western ‘individualist’ versus Soviet ‘collectivist’ binary that defined 
much Cold War discourse, other important factors significantly complicated this 
overarching image. While the British and Americans were initially content to have the 
individual powers responsible for trying Nazi defendants, it was the Soviet position that 
these proceedings be a distinctly internationalized endeavor.
148
 Additionally, it was the 
Soviet jurist Aron Trainin who was among the strongest proponents of the position that 
in the name of promoting peace, responsibility for the war must belong to individual 
Nazi leaders and not the German people collectively.
149
 Thus, while international 
cooperation and the separation of individual guilt from collective responsibility are 
defining hallmarks of the contemporary international criminal justice project’s liberal 
cosmopolitan credentials, their modern origins were ironically Soviet. As such, 
considering these patterns of Soviet legal innovation provides a new perspective on how 
the crime of aggression attained its unprecedented conditions of possibility.  
In his influential book Hitlerite Responsibility Under Criminal Law, Trainin argued 
that planning and conducting an aggressive war furnished individual criminal liability 
under international law, directly influencing the positions of the Western Allies, 
particularly the U.S.
150
According to Trainin’s distinctly historical materialist approach to 
connecting war, international law, and individual culpability, the very nature of modern 
interstate interaction generates the potential for international criminal deviance on 
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varying orders of magnitude and, for this reason, legal liability for breaching the rules of 
war was distinct from legal liability for planning or waging an unjustifiable war.
151
 This 
analytical co-consideration of historically-shaped material conditions and the legitimacy 




In Trainin’s theory, the precise nature of international crimes is derived directly from 
the necessity of trans-border connections and associations in a world of social relations 
formed through the expansion of capitalist political economy.
153
 In theorizing the material 
harm that places these offences within the scope of global condemnation, through a 
proto-theory of the ‘everyday life of international law,’ he states that “[t]he perpetrators 
of such crimes delay the movement of trains, ships, freight, circulating between nations; 
they try to create obstacles, and to set up one country against another, one people against 
another.”154 Consequently, it is from these premises that peace emerges as a first principle 
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to the interests of the masses of the people — or whether it is a war of aggrandizement, conducted 
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153
 Id., at 39-40. 
154
 TRAININ, supra note 157, at 40; For a contemporary exploration of the ‘everyday life of 
international law’ see generally LUIS ESLAVA, LOCAL SPACE, GLOBAL LIFE: THE EVERYDAY 
OPERATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (2015) (An application of 
ethnographic methods to expose the lived manifestations international legal regimes through an 
examination of the site of Bogota, Colombia). Although this depiction seemingly conforms to the 
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criminal law could play an important role in this capacity. In linking these issues, Trainin stated 
the following:  
“The post-war organization of the world will probably introduce new forms of communication 
between countries, and, in the sphere of economics, the supplying and purveyance of raw 
materials, fuel, restoration of the destroyed economic life, etc. In conformity with this, the 
question of new forms of offenses against the basis of international association may arise: offenses 
against the economic basis of international association.”  
TRAININ, supra note 157, at 54-55. 
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for international coexistence for Trainin,
155
 and this being the case, as Justice Robert 
Jackson, the U.S. chief counsel at Nuremberg, would later famously echo, “[a]ggression 
is therefore the most dangerous international crime.”156           
Given Trainin’s materialist approach to finding individual criminal liability for 
aggressive war under international law, what is especially pertinent is his orientation 
towards the conditions of possibility required for this novel prosecutorial regime to 
become a durable feature of the international order. In this capacity, it is highly revealing 
that according to Trainin’s account of failed attempts to criminalize aggression during the 
interwar period, 
[t]he extremely weak study of the problem of international criminal law was, of course, 
not accidental. It was due to the general nature of the international legal relations in the 
imperialistic era. The policy of aggressive imperialistic supremacy, a constant threat to 
peace, a policy systematically giving ample scope for the use of force in the sphere of 
international relations, naturally could not contribute to the development and 
strengthening of international law as a system of rules protecting the liberty, independence 
and sovereignty of nations.
157
   
Trainin’s awareness of the contradictions of liberal international law during the 
interwar era echoed the insights of earlier Soviet jurists working within a broadly Leninist 
tradition of analyzing imperialism.
158
 The Soviet experience showed that, contrary to the 
all-pervasive visions of progressive renewal that captivated many during the interwar era, 
international law was subject to atavistic regressions when strategic interests, such as the 
Nazi attempt to turn Eastern Europe into the type of imperial order that existed in Asia 
and Africa, warranted this shift.
159
 In this sense, the Nazi rejection of the laws of war on 
the Eastern Front can be viewed as having an antecedent within the Mandate system 
whereby assertions that compliance with the laws of war evinced ‘civilization’ among 
subject peoples generated backlashes asserting that these laws were incomprehensible, 





 Id., at 47. 
156
 Id., at 48. 
157
 Id., at 7. 
158
 See Mamlyuk, Decolonization, supra note 36, at 202-204. 
159
 Mark Mazower, An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the 
Mid-Twentieth Century, 82 INT’L AFFAIRS 553, 562-563 (2006). 
160
 Here Quincy Wright’s progressive assertion on this point (The Bombardment of Damascus, 
20 AM. J. INT’L L. 263 (1926) (“it does not seem that the different culture or the fact of tutelage 
would withdraw Syrians from the protection of the law of war if that law were otherwise applicable, 
and they themselves were prepared to observe it.”)), was met with an infamous rejection of this 
applicability by Elbridge Colby (How to Fight Savage Tribes, 21 AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 279 (1927)); 
On this debate and its context see Frederic Megret, From ‘Savages’ to ‘Unlawful Combatants’: A 
Postcolonial Look at International Humanitarian Law’s Other, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
ITS OTHERS 265, 275-278 (Anne Orford, ed., 2006); A possible reason for the obscuring of links 
between the racialized violence of Mandate system colonialism and its exponential intensification 
through the Nazi campaign on the Eastern Front concerns the tendency to fetish ‘war’ as a 
particular legal status that changes the applicability of rules (For an overview of this discourse see 
generally Iain Scobbie, War, in CONCEPTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
DISCIPLINARY THOUGHT 900 (Jean d’Aspremont & Sahib Singh, eds., 2019)). While the Nazis 
36 UNBOUND Vol. 12:1, 2019 
 
occurrences should not be understood as existing outside the law, for even making a 




Against this backdrop, Trainin can be read as providing a juridical analysis that was 
far more suited to exposing these contradictory realities than prevailing international legal 
theories.
162
 Here, we can see how Trainin’s insights illuminate the necessity of exposing 
material contradictions connecting capital, empire, and violence when understanding the 
relationship between international law and the effective condemnation war. In other 
words, successful juridical outcomes actively required a detailed mapping of their 
material conditions of possibility. Yet what, if anything, was the basis for Trainin’s belief 
that international law could be effective? A possible explanation centers on the 
anticipation that Soviets would be vastly empowered in reinventing international law in 




C. Envisioning an Anti-Imperial International Order to Come 
 
When it came to differentiating the aftermath of the Second World War from the 
interwar period, a bold vision of the Soviet agenda for an anti-imperial world order was 
presented by Trainin’s colleague Evgeny (Eugene) Korovin in a 1946 article entitled ‘The 
Second World War and International Law.’164 For anyone familiar with the recurring 
liberal triumphalist narratives surrounding international law and institutions, of which 
international criminal justice is arguably the crown jewel, Korovin’s piece reads as if it 
was written in a parallel universe. However, on a deeper level, many traces of his 
arguments are visible in the modern international legal discourses commonly associated 
with the aspirations and anxieties of liberalism. By covering a vast array of issues, 
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Korovin’s general claim can be read as a resounding statement that imagining a world 
where international law can end war means reimagining world order as we know it.            
For Korovin, the juridical ordering of the postwar world could be viewed in 
evolutionary terms, in that “[s]ome [international legal concepts] the war overthrew and 
dispersed as ashes in the wind; others it elevated to an unprecedented height.”165 In this 
capacity, two core features he substantively reevaluates are sovereign equality and the 
exclusivity of states as international legal subjects. Both of these positions bore directly 
on the Soviet view of the crime of aggression. On the question of sovereign equality, for 
Korovin, this meant drawing an inverse distinction between aggressor states and ‘peace-
loving’ states whereby limiting the sovereignty of the former was required to affirm the 
sovereignty of the later.
166
 After all, “[i]n the final analysis it must be admitted that there 
is not and cannot be such a code of international law as would be equally acceptable to 
the cannibal and his victim.”167 This being the case, he lambasted traditionalist 
understandings of sovereignty and actively embraced great power privileges via the UN 
Security Council’s guarantor function on the grounds of the extraordinary sacrifices 
made by these states during the War.
168
 As a result, his position was that 
[g]enuine democracy and juridical levelling have nothing in common, and the 
organization of international relations on formal and levelling principles would be a crying 
violation of the most elementary equality, inasmuch as it would lead to absurd privileges 
for small states, which would be accorded international rights on a par with the Great 
Powers but would at the same time be free from the most important international 




However, despite this defense of qualified sovereign equality, Korovin was just as 
contemptuous of (predominantly British) theories of ‘world government’/post-sovereign 
internationalism. Under his view, “[t]he chief fault of these theories lies in their authors’ 
inability or refusal to understand that the roots of aggressive nationalism, which the world 
parliament is to check, lie in the very nature of imperialism… The nature and essence of 
imperialism cannot be changed by any amount of parliamentary voting.”170 Thus, Korovin 
claimed, “to reject the conception of sovereignty…would always help those who are 
strong and would never benefit those who are weak,” a pronouncement made evident by 
the realities of the British Empire which showed how post-sovereignty ideals in the name 
of peace were eminently consistent with the violent domination of subject peoples.
171
 Yet 
despite this, Korovin held to the notion that emancipatory world leadership by the so-
called Great Powers was possible, for “there is another type of state (the Soviet), whose 
social nature completely precludes even the possibility of such a[n] [imperial] 
transformation.”172 Furthermore, while Korovin viewed the maintenance of colonialism 
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via the UN Trusteeship Council system to be a wrongful denial of self-determination, 
Soviet membership in this organization could provide rectification, for the Soviet Union 
had “fully solved the problem of the peaceful collaboration and the fraternal relationship 
of different people.”173             
On the related topic of Korovin’s critique of state exclusivity in international law, an 
intriguing parallel can be drawn between two sets on non-state entities of which he calls 
for elevated participation and condemnation respectively. On the one hand, Korovin 
invokes the sacrifice of the working class in the winning of the war, asking why 
transnational associations of workers, namely the sixty-five-million-member World 
Trade Union Federation, did not have international legal personality when they were 
often larger and more active in international affairs than many of the world’s states.174 He 
thus implores us to think about the ways in which “the admission of the largest 
international workers’ organizations into the United Nations with a consultative 
vote…would considerably promote the progressive development and democratization of 
international law.”175 On the other hand, in turning to the subjects of condemnation, he 
invokes Nuremberg. Rather than simply fixate on the unprecedented trial of state actors 
under international law, he highlights the novelty of imposing liability on “entire 
institutions and organizations (the Gestapo, the German high command, the leaders of 
the Nazi party, the SS and SA) as well as private individuals (German industrialists, 
landowners, slaveowners and others).”176            
In this way, Korovin’s analysis is consistent with Trainin’s focus on deep material 
interconnections as the basis for imposing broad findings of individual liability for 
aggression. For Trainin, fascism’s multi-layered strategies for provoking aggressive 
militarism both within and between nations demanded that the scope of the crime of 
aggression be correspondingly broad in its condemnation.
177
 For Korovin, such a 
widespread diffusion of criminal liability raised questions of whether the Third Reich as 
a “regime of ‘rule by criminals’” practicing “international banditism”178 was in fact 
representative of an entirely new international legal subject of which international 
criminal law was asserted as an early attempt at defining.
179
 After all, this was not an effort 
to uniquely pathologize Germany, for Korovin advanced a position conspicuously similar 
to Trainin’s denial of the collective German guilt that emphasized the reformability of 
the German state.
180
 Thus, based on the perspective provided by Korovin’s parallel, the 
Second World War on the Eastern Front as “a scared people’s war against an aggressor 
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and enslaver”181 can be viewed as a clash between two distinct non-state entities that could 
not be adequately accounted for under international law’s prevailing state-centrism: the 
global working class and the fascist alliance of violent fanatics with industrial capital. The 
former’s legitimacy had yet to be acknowledged, the latter’s illegitimacy had yet to be 
understood. Thus, while Trainin formulated a novel justification for holding individuals 
liable for planning and waging unjustifiable wars, Korovin showed how this innovation 
was just part of a much grander transformative effort that was ultimately rooted in the 
Soviet agenda of world revolution.    
IV. State vs. Revolution: The Fate of Soviet Anti-Aggression  
 
A. Hypocrisy, Commitment, and the Bar of Radical Transformation 
 
However powerful these immediate postwar visions were, a central contradiction 
emerged that had far-reaching effects on the way in which the condemnation of 
aggression shaped the Soviet Union’s anti-imperial agenda. This contradiction centered 
on whether the Soviet Union, as a matter of both internal and external perception, was 
best understood as a sovereign state or the foundation of a new form of world order that 
would ultimately transcend state sovereignty by achieving full-communism.
182
 This issue 
presented a strategic dilemma in the wake of the Bolsheviks’ consolidation of power 
when it became apparent that internally strengthening the Soviet Union could easily 
come at the expense of exporting world revolution.
183
 It was in this context that, following 
the death of Lenin, Trotsky’s attempt to ignite ‘Permanent Revolution’ out of the 
perceived need to capture the most advanced industrial infrastructure in Germany 
ultimately lost to Stalin’s strategy of building ‘Socialism in One Country.’184           
In viewing this ‘state versus revolution’ issue through the lens of legally condemning 
aggression as a strategic tool, emphasizing the Soviet Union’s status as a state was the 
obvious choice. After all, a core truism of international law is that states, and not 
revolutions or revolutionaries, are the field’s rights-holders of record.185 Acknowledging 
this basic, yet under-analyzed, reality makes all the difference when theorizing the ways 
in which the Soviet embrace of the crime of aggression furthered the cause of its 
continued sovereign existence while stunting the revolutionary horizons aimed at moving 
social relations beyond the nation state-form and its corresponding class-based 
stratifications. Here, the Soviet drive to prosecute Nazis detailed by Trainin, whereby 
criminal liability was largely coextensive with an entire ideology, was formulated with the 
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end of ensuring the survival of the Soviet Union against such movements that used 
portrayals of Soviet illegitimacy as an animating impetus for fanatical violence.
186
 The fact 
that this veneration of state sovereignty contradicted earlier critiques of the capitalist state-
system is a testament to the way in which the Second World War fortified Stalin’s 
conception of ‘Socialism in One Country’ and thus rendered earlier alternative, anti-
statist formulations increasingly distant memories.
187
 At this nexus of state survival and 
legal legitimacy in the aftermath of war, criminal prosecutions could achieve what 
summary executions never could. As Kirsten Sellars describes, “A bullet in the neck 
destroyed just one ‘Hitlerite,’ whereas a full trial—which would give a detailed exposition 
of all the crimes of the Nazi regime—would destroy both the ‘Hitlerite’ and the ideology 
he stood for, thereby protecting the Soviet Union from future harm.”188            
However, the Soviet experience of guaranteeing the survival of ‘Socialism in One 
Country’ through the official elimination of political dissidents—including, among others, 
the Trotskyites who asserted that exporting world revolution was more important than 
state consolidation—provided the background of this conclusion.189 That said, it is not 
difficult to see how the Soviet approach to analogizing anti-statist radical movements to 
wartime offenders through criminal law theories of conspiracy and joint enterprise deeply 
resonated with the Western Allies whose own histories taught them the value of 
specialized legal argument for suppressing radical movements that contested centralized 
authority, especially in the domain of organized labor.
190
 In many ways, this state of affairs 
has its origins in Western interventions to suppress the Bolsheviks by supporting rival 
factions during the Russian Civil War, for this fueled the formation of an all-powerful 
repressive state-apparatus asserting itself as necessary for eliminating the revolution’s 
internal and external enemies.
191
 This process of administrative consolidation in the face 
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of hostile interventionism had a major stunting effect on the mobilization of legal theory 
as a vessel for furthering radical consciousness. After all, the 1937 execution of the Soviet 
Union’s one-time leading jurist Evgeny Pashukanis resulted from the fact that his theory 
of law ‘withering away’ undermined the Stalinist project building of an all-pervasive legal 
architecture.
192
 Yet, despite these developments whereby the Soviet Union became 
dedicated to exceedingly punitive understandings of law, sovereignty, and the state, it 
nonetheless maintained that these were necessary measures in furtherance of the world 
revolution.
193
            
However, using the crime of aggression towards this end presented yet another 
dilemma, in that invoking international law as a vessel for asserting state autonomy also 
committed an actor to the general premise of sovereign equality.
194
 This presented 
significant problems for the Soviet Union given its status as a great power with a distinct 
mission that was nonetheless deeply fearful of its own extinction (an outcome the 
criminalization of aggression sought to prevent). Such anxiety was apparent in Korovin’s 
above-discussed skepticism concerning the relationship between a transformed world 
order and strict juridical equality between states that led him to celebrate the legalized 
hegemony that elevated the Soviet Union within the new UN Security Council system.
195
 
After all, the discourse of aggression as a means of upholding sovereign equality provides 
common cause among small and weak states despite the significant differences they may 
otherwise possess, including diverging commitments to a capitalist versus a socialist global 
order.
196
 How, then, were the Soviets to approach small states pursuing interests and 
ideologies that undermined world revolutionary aims while also seeking to preserve their 
independence by invoking the anti-aggression rhetoric the Soviets had ostensibly 
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 By condemning such states, the Soviet Union risked 
undermining alliances with similarly situated weak actors who may have had some 
sympathies for Soviet agenda despite recognizing the imperative of preserving their 
sovereignty.
198
 As such, this dynamic complicated the foundational Leninist view that the 
unconditional independence and liberation of all nations was necessary for the 
emancipation of the global proletariat and, as such, was a world revolutionary imperative.             
In accounting for this contradiction, and its role as a lightning rod of contestation 
haunting future attempts to address aggression through international law, one need only 
consider how early Soviet practices to achieve self-determination were later undone by 
Stalin. The early Soviet recognition of the right of self-determination regarding Finland 
(whose independence was opposed by the Bolsheviks’ opponents), the Baltic states, and, 
less successfully, Ukraine and Armenia materially echoed Lenin’s proclamation of 
national liberation as a revolutionary necessity.
199
 Yet, despite these early commitments, 
their ultimate durability proved exceedingly difficult to reconcile with subsequent Soviet 
actions, such as the 1939 Soviet invasion of Finland in order to acquire territories 
perceived as vital to the defense against the expansion of Germany that led to the Soviet 
Union’s expulsion from the League of Nations.200 Then, there was the declaration of non-
aggression between Hitler and Stalin via the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact where the German 
invasion of Poland was accompanied by a separate Soviet invasion from the East.
201
 This 
same Pact led to the Soviet occupation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 1940 which, 
following Nazi domination from 1941-44 after the Pact’s breakdown, remained 
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Neutrals and International Law in World War II, 11 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 171, 229 (1962).  
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influence, see RINNA KULLA, NON-ALIGNMENT AND ITS ORIGINS IN COLD WAR EUROPE: 
YUGOSLAVIA, FINLAND AND THE SOVIET CHALLENGE (2011). 
199
 Bowring, supra note 120, at 145. 
200
 GINSBURGS, supra note 156, at 128; Interesting enough, one of the conditions for Soviet 
withdrawal in their armistice with Finland was that the Fins surrender all those accused of war 
crimes to Allied custody, Finland Soviet Union: Armistice, September 17, 1944,  39 AM. J. INT’L 
L. SUPP. 85, 87 (1945).  
201
 This was justified through the doctrine of debellatio where it was claimed that the earlier Nazi 
invasion resulted in a complete state death. That said despite the existence of the 1921 Soviet-
Polish peace treaty “[t]he extinction of the Polish state would…legally terminate all the treaties, 
agreements and conventions signed between the U.S.S.R. and Poland.” George Ginsburgs, A 
Case Study in the Soviet Use of International Law: Eastern Poland in 1939, 52 AM. J. INT’L L. 
69, 70 (1958); It must be noted that there was nothing inherently Soviet about this argument. Such 
an outcome was perfectly consistent with Hans Kelsen’s theory that a state stripped of its 
fundamental features (i.e. an effective government), lacked standing to compel another state to 
recognize it. Hans Kelsen, Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations, 35 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 605, 611 (1941); Kelsen would later apply this reasoning to Allied-occupied Germany 
following the War. See e.g. Hans Kelsen, The Legal Status of Germany according to the 
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unlawfully occupied by the Soviets until 1990.
202
 Given these events and the fact that the 
Soviets were themselves arguably liable for aggression as a result, how can the Soviet 
position regarding the criminality of aggression as part of a postwar anti-imperial world 
order to come be understood?
203
             
In answering this question, one must focus on the Soviet Union’s enduring self-
perception as the fulcrum of the world revolution that continued despite the critical mass 
of contradictions generated by its attempt to harness international law and the nation 
state-form with the ultimate purpose of transcending these institutions. Thus, if survival 
above all else was the only way to keep the kernel of world revolution alive, then anything 
was warranted to achieve this end. After all, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was underlined 
by a parallel mode of justification stemming from Hitler’s idea that the inherent weakness 
of liberal democracy would extinguish these ‘transitory’ forms of government leaving only 
authoritarian fascist and socialist regimes.
204
 A great tragedy of Soviet ascent to this type 
of logic, and its implicit minimization of the Nazi’s role within global capitalism, was that 
it dispensed with the warnings articulated by Lenin’s theory of inter-imperial rivalry and 
cast the Soviets as participants in the type of tragic state-centric geopolitics the original 
world revolution sought to transcend.
205
 This is readily observable in the way Finland, 
Poland, and the Baltic states, in varying degrees, suffered the fate of overrun ‘buffer 
states’ between great powers which, as an empirical matter, are those most likely to face 
extinction within the international system.
206
 In this context, and in light of Hitler’s 
devastating betrayal of the Soviet Union, Korovin’s optimistic articulation of a new world 
where aggressors are punished and small states would no-longer “become blind weapons 
for the aggressive schemes of others” can be understood in an almost redemptive sense 
whereby Soviet mistakes would inform visions of the future.
207
 However, given the fate 
that befell Soviet theorists like Pashukanis whose insights contradicted Stalin’s actions 
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 Peter Stirk, John H. Herz and the International Law of the Third Reich, 22 INT’L RELATIONS 
427, 430 (2008).  
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STUD.  421 (1996); On the Nazi’s fundamental position within the structures of global capitalism 
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 See Tanisha Fazal, State Death in the International System, 58 INT’L ORG. 311, 313-315 (2004). 
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 Korovin, Second World War, supra. note 1, at 746; A similar view was expressed by Chakste, 
according to whom, treaties between the Soviet Union and non-socialist states, namely the Hitler-
Stalin Pact, resulted from a mistaken assumption that self-interest alone could be a source of 
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and agendas, Korovin’s lack of further critical scrutiny on this point is entirely 
unsurprising.            
Moreover, the prospect of further cooperation between the victorious powers 
dwindled as the immediate postwar consensus broke down, the Cold War ensued, and 
a new bipolar geopolitical order pitting the U.S. and the Soviet Union as rival, 
ideologically-opposed superpowers became apparent. The Soviets had little incentive for 
self-critique when it came to debating aggression within the new UN System. Despite the 
UN’s early affirmation of the Nuremberg Principles as a foundational pillar of the 
emergent new world order in need of further development,
208
 progress on this front was 
limited as the question of aggression proved a recurring flashpoint of recrimination as 
the agendas of the Second World War’s victors drifted further and further apart. In the 
ensuing debates, while the West had the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as leverage on the 
Soviets, the Soviets had leverage on the West regarding their pre-war appeasement 
policies towards the Nazis whereby Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland region was handed 
over to Germany via the 1938 Munich Agreement.
209
 Thus, while both blocs sought to 
derive legitimacy from their particular interpretations of the Nuremberg legacy, the 
historical reality was that “Nazism had tarnished them all.”210 
 
B. Decolonization and the Matter of Third World Sovereignty 
          
In addition to growing contentions between the two superpower blocs, another source 
of both opportunity and frustration for the Soviet rhetoric of aggression came with 
increasingly robust movements for decolonization in Asia and Africa and the many 
international legal issues they presented.
211
 With this growing momentum in the postwar 
era, the Soviets were well positioned to mobilize their contradictory tradition of asserting 
the right to self-determination in the name of international law.
212
 In doing so, they had 
the advantage of a sympathetic audience, given that many who rallied under the banner 
of Third World opposition to Western imperialism viewed the Russian Revolution as a 
source of inspiration and transferrable strategy in relation to their own struggles.
213
 
However, while self-determination and individual liability for aggression may have been 
mutually reinforcing when it came to furthering the Soviets’ particular method of 
furthering world revolution, this connection would be contested by certain voices within 
the broader anti-colonial liberation movement. The Soviet theorists who viewed the 
postwar international criminal trials as profound opportunities to reinvent the 
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international legal order had to contend with an alternative critical engagement with 
international criminal justice pioneered at the Tokyo Tribunal through the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Radhabinod Pal of India.
214
 For Pal, any imposition of retroactive 
criminal liability would have legitimized imperialism because Japanese actions were no 
different from what European Empires were continuing to do while the ‘universal’ 
principles justifying the convictions were formulated without any input from the 
colonized peoples who were systematically degraded.
215
 In formulating this view, Pal was 
influenced by earlier British imperial invocations of ‘crimes against peace’ that justified 
ruthlessly suppressing local rebellions in colonial India.
216
 This informed a deep 
skepticism of whether invoking criminal liability for triggering unjustifiable conflicts could 
ever be effectively wielded by a weaker party against a stronger one.
217
  
Pal’s treatment of Trainin’s theory and the reliance on it by his fellow Justices at the 
Tokyo Tribunal subjected the Soviets’ commitment to anti-imperialism to critique.218 
While admiring Trainin for making “a very valuable contribution to deep juridical 
thinking,” Pal declared that his insights on these points simply did not reflect what the 
law actually was, which had everything to do with the problem of victor’s justice.219 In 
linking these issues, according to Pal, “At most, Mr. Trainin has only established a 
demand of the changing international life. But, I doubt whether this [ban on war] can be 
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effects that this may have on the development of international law. Pal’s Judgment, supra note 
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 Id. 
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a genuine demand of that life and whether it can be effectively met by the introduction 
of such a criminal responsibility which would under the present organization only 
succeed in fixing such responsibility upon the parties to a lost War.”220 In advancing from 
this premise through his critique of Trainin for ignoring “the fact that even now national 
sovereignty continues to be the basic fact of international life and that the acts in question 
affect the very essence of this sovereignty,” Pal exposed the Soviet jurists’ above-discussed 
contradictions regarding the concept of sovereignty.
221
 In this way, he implicitly 
anticipated divisiveness of this issue that would inform Soviet-Third World relations to 
come. In an intimately related capacity, Pal directly confronted Trainin’s focus on the 
materially-grounded desirability for criminalizing aggression, but could not muster a 
similar level of enthusiasm for the immediate doctrinal and institutional reinvention of 
international law.
222
 This was due in great part to his position that the state practice Trainin 
asserted as demonstrating universal respect for the autonomy of all nations against the 
ambitions of aggressors was plainly contradicted by the actually-existing realities of 
colonialism.
223
 Yet, perhaps even more importantly, Pal worried how establishing an 
international legal basis for criminalizing aggressive war could be invoked against those 
seeking independence in a world where “[t]here are still dominated and enslaved nations, 
and there is no provision anywhere in the system for peaceful readjustment without 
struggle. It is left to the nations themselves to see to the readjustment.”224           
This fear of the crime aggression being invoked to distort (and possibly undermine) 
anti-colonial struggles came to inform the larger position of the Non-Aligned 
Movement.
225
 In addition to contrasting Western concerns regarding the difficulty of 
developing a ‘legitimate’ regime of prosecuting aggression in a politically polarized 
climate, such fears helped shift focus from individual criminalization being the locus of 
aggression’s illegality.226 Questions returned to the interwar approach whereby aggression 
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was condemned as an act for which a state is collectively liable. Here, the central debate 
was between a West seeking to place the supreme discretion for determining acts of 
aggression in the Security Council and a Third World seeking to develop a universal 
definition of aggression that no institutionalized concentration of power could subvert.
227
 
In this context, the Soviet Union “was in a unique position of being both a Security 
Council member and the self-appointed leader of the General Assembly’s campaigns for 
disarmament and national liberation.”228 According to Carl Schmitt’s general appraisal of 
this unorthodox and contradictory geopolitical logic, “with an equally striking and 
symptomatic modification: the world’s greatest land power, the Soviet Union, which was 
the strongest potential occupier, stood now on the side of small states.”229             
As the state-centric controversy over aggression became the common medium for 
characterizing legitimate versus illegitimate uses of force against the tumultuous backdrop 
of the Cold War and decolonization, Soviet commitments were stretched in multiple 
directions. Here a major shift occurred as the Soviets began to abandon the Leninist 
theoretical precept that the forces of global capitalism and the forces of world revolution 
would inevitably clash.
230
 In 1956, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev drew on a doctrine 
largely theorized by Korovin to put forth the concept of  ‘Peaceful Coexistence,’ a meant 
to affirm the UN Charter system’s general ban on the use of force while seeking to move 
Soviet-Western competition from the realm of armed confrontation to the realm of 
competing socio-economic models.
231
 However, ‘Peaceful Coexistence,’ which in many 
ways was a response to the development of nuclear weapons,
232
 was interpreted as a 
revisionist betrayal by many engaged in anti-colonial struggle who viewed Soviet 
rapprochement with the West as the abandonment of world revolution.
233
 This created 
space for the UN-excluded People’s Republic of China to assert itself as the world 
revolution’s true leader, as the Soviets were simply another manifestation of ‘white 
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colonizers’ seeking to exploit the decolonizing and postcolonial world for its own ends.234 
Against the pressures of this competition, the Soviets “began increasingly to emphasize 
that peaceful coexistence did not exclude armed struggle in the developing world.”235 This 
move involved articulating understandings of national liberation struggles where any use 
of force by the West to maintain its colonies constituted aggression, and any anti-colonial 
resistance was self-defense against the aggression that occurred through the original act 
of colonization.
236
            
However, this massively broad Soviet stance towards aggression opened the Soviets 
to condemnations of hypocrisy for interventions within their proclaimed ‘sphere of 
influence,’ namely the invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.237 
While the West condemned the Soviet justification of aiding socialism via its Brezhnev 
Doctrine as a pretext for aggression, the Soviets countered that West could not speak of 
such issues given that their ‘pro-democratic’ interventions via the Johnson/Reagan 
Doctrines demonstrated their own lack of ideological neutrality.
238
 However, criticism of 
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the Soviet position was in no way restricted to the West, with one prominent line of 
Marxist-Third Worldist argument coming through Non-Aligned Yugoslav 
pronouncements that, contra Korovin, it was entirely possible for powerful socialist states 
to repress weaker ones.
239
 In light of this context, on the question of aggression and state 
sovereignty, the Non-Aligned argument can ultimately be deemed the great victor, for in 
condemning the excesses of both the Eastern and Western blocs, it upheld 
contemporary international law’s foundational premise of a world of states bound by a 
duty to mutually respect one another’s sovereignty.240            
Paradoxically, this robust affirmation of sovereignty as something to be protected 
from aggression ended up limiting the possibility of criminally prosecuting individuals 
for aggression in the name of international law.
241
 After all, developing a regime capable 
of efficiently adjudicating the crime of aggression would require a massive reconfiguration 
of sovereignty and this could prove especially detrimental to weak and marginalized states 
in the Global South.
242
 This interplay of aggression, sovereignty, and individual liability 
produced a dilemma for proponents of Third World sovereignty. On the one hand, 
advocating for aggression’s inclusion in contemporary international criminal justice 
allows for perhaps the best institutionally-cognizable continuation of the original cause of 
condemning aggression in the name of affirming peripheral sovereignty.
243
 On the other 
hand, the very act of affirming international criminal justice strengthens a project that 
contains much in-built opposition to sovereignty-affirming collectivist endeavors by virtue 
of its foundational focus on individual narratives of victimhood and perpetration.
244
            
Thus, when trapped between a binary that pits sovereignty against individualization, 
it is difficult to radically exceed the limitations of both these constraints in the name of 
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achieving emancipation on a higher level.
245
 Ironically, this present impasse is in many 
ways rooted in a Soviet vision of the world that sought to transcend both individualism 
and the nation-state through world revolution while simultaneously preserving the power 
and privileges of state sovereignty to accomplish this goal. In this sense, Soviet efforts to 
impose individual criminal liability for aggressive war as a means of hedging their state’s 
survival with the aim of achieving world revolution resulted from the compounded 
contradictions of attempting to reconfigure existing institutional logics in the name of 
fundamentally transformative ends. That said, mapping the material dimensions that 
produced this outcome forms a quintessential case study in Barry Buzan and George 
Lawson’s observation that “there is a great paradox at the heart of the relationship 
between revolutionary states and international society — revolutionary states must 
establish relations with other states and coexist with the system’s rules, laws and 
institutions even while professing to reject these practices.”246 However, while 
transformative attempts to declare aggression criminal may have imposed numerous 
constraints on revolutionary actors, the same logic did not apply to liberal actors. Thus, 
despite the widespread appeal of condemning aggression in the name of anti-
imperialism, it was the ideological inheritors of the Western Allies at Nuremberg who 
were given the opportunity to reinvent international criminal justice according to their 
own ideals. In the face of this shift, the radical lineage that harkens back to once extensive 
Soviet visions of criminalizing aggressive war in the name of world revolution was 
reduced to a progressively diminishing shield against the excesses of liberal 
interventionism.   
V. Conclusion: Whither the Geopolitical Dimensions of Global 
Justice?  
 
Given the very real contradictions within the international order, it is in many ways 
unsurprising that the project of using the crime of aggression as a strategy of 
transformative change has long remained trapped by the reality that it is both a source of 
captivation and virtually unimaginable with respect to implementation in light of existing 
institutional realities. Moreover, this stagnation was coupled with diverging progressive 
developments where, in a turn from ‘aggression to atrocity,’ Western liberals began 
articulating the foundations of an alternative approach to international criminal justice 
critical of the notion that waging an illegal war was truly the ‘supreme international crime’ 
giving rise to all of the others.
247
 While numerous interconnected historical developments 
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and ideological innovations brought about this reality, perhaps the most important was 
the 1970s emergence of ‘universal human rights’ as a utopian project that coincided with 
a general decline of faith in postcolonial statehood given the recurring instances of 
internal violence that continued into the age of formal independence.
248
 With this shift in 
consciousness came the 1975 Helsinki Final Act whereby a liberal vocabulary of 
international human rights was mobilized as a discourse of resistance against the Soviets’ 
maintenance of their sphere of influence in the Eastern Bloc.
249
 Additionally, within this 
larger human rights campaign, Soviet dissidents became prominent figures through 
accounts of their experiences of deprivation at the hands of a ‘totalitarian’ regime.250 On 
the question of violence, too, the work of scholars such as Judith Shklar established a 
theoretical position proclaiming that acts of physical cruelty are truly the greatest evil and 
rectifying them is justified, even when doing so would be hypocritical.
251
 Thus, taken as a 
whole, these developments brought with them the specter of enhanced legitimacy for 
undermining sovereignty and extending the use of force in ways that, despite being 
frequently invoked as ‘novel’ developments, have a long history of being deployed at the 
expense of states and peoples in the Global South.
252
             
The crime of aggression as a discourse available to weak and marginalized states, 
however, illuminates the potential inherent within international criminal justice for 
affirming sovereignty in addition to its dangers of undermining said sovereignty, thereby 
forcing zealous opponents to confront their hypocrisy.
253
 However, given recent 
theoretical developments within this ongoing turn ‘from aggression to atrocity,’ the crime 
of aggression’s ability to continue serving in this role may soon come under a great deal 
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of pressure. A view is instead emerging that, despite commonly held assumptions on all 
sides of the debate, it is individuals, and not sovereign states, who are the true victims of 
the crime of aggression. According to Tom Dannebaum, the leading theorist of this new 
interpretation, “[t]he crime of aggression fills a normative gap, capturing a rare category 
of unjustified large-scale killing that is not criminally prohibited by any other provision 
of domestic or international law—namely the killing of combatants and collateral civilians 
in an illegal war.”254            
This attempt to disarm the crime of aggression’s ability to uphold sovereignty, 
particularly of weak states, and reinvent it as the culmination of an all-encompassing 
scheme of cosmopolitan justice cannot be read in isolation. Here, one need only 
consider the way an entire body of a ‘customary international law of non-international 
armed conflict’ was refined through the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals 
in a move prompted by the reality that postcolonial states largely refused to subject the 
comprehensive regulation of internal disorders to a multilateral treaty out of fears it 
would be invoked to undermine their sovereignty.
255
 While this development concerned 
the conduct of hostilities in the context of jus in bello, there recently has been a 
corresponding discourse of ‘internal jus ad bellum’ whereby the traditional justifications 
for condemning violence between states are being applied to violence within states with 
the effect of further limiting sovereignty.
256
 The importance of such developments and 
their impact on aggression discourse’s present political utility cannot be overstated given 
the way they raise the possibility of a crime of aggression that is consistent with expanding 
practices of ‘humanitarian intervention.’257 This has the power to directly mobilize the 
very interventionist justifications that motivated so much peripheral, postcolonial, and 
counter-hegemonic advocacy for the crime of aggression as a tool for curbing the 





 Tom Dannenbaum, Politics, the Rule of Law, and the Role of the Crime of Aggression: A 
Response to Koh and Buchwald, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 235, 238-239 (2016); For an 
examination of this ‘human core of aggression’ see Dannenbaum, supra note 5, at 1270-1278.  
255
 See Tamas Hoffman, The Gentle Humanizer of Humanitarian Law — Antonio Cassese and 
the Creation of the Customary Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, in FUTURE 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 58, 61-62 (Carsten Stahn & Larissa van 
den Herik, eds., 2010). 
256
 For assessment of this idea see generally Eliav Lieblich, Internal Jus ad Bellum, 67 HASTINGS 
L. J. 687 (2016). 
257
 See Dannenbaum, supra note 5, at 1295-1301; While excluding humanitarian intervention 
from the crime of aggression would not necessarily render humanitarian intervention legal (see 
Jennifer Trahan, Defining the ‘Grey Area’ where Humanitarian Intervention may not be Fully 
Legal, but is not the Crime of Aggression, 2 J. USE OF FORCE & INT’L L. 42 (2015)), there remains 
the possibility that allowing humanitarian intervention to justify otherwise illegal actions would 
enable it to operate as a de facto policy unimpeded. For a case study of an exception swallowing 
the rule regarding the practice of torture see Itamar Mann & Omer Shatz, The Necessity 
Procedure: Laws of Torture in Israel and Beyond, 1987-2009, 6 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL 
LEFT 59 (2010). 
258
 De Bock, supra note 260, at 106; Here it must be noted that humanitarian intervention’s sister 
doctrine, ‘the Responsibility to Protect’, shares key features with highly controversial justifications 
for self-defense whereby an external party can use force against non-state actors when the host 
state proves ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’ suppress them. Sara Kendall, Cartographies of the Present: 
Vol. 12:1, 2019 LOEFFLAD: WORLD REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS 53 
 
In light of these recent developments, the relevance of multifaceted Soviet historical 
entanglements with the crime of aggression becomes apparent. After all, regardless of the 
good intentions of those promoting this transcendent cosmopolitan theory of aggression, 
this project represents a concerted abstraction of international legality from the 
materiality of its primary subject matter.
259
 This is highly problematic given that these 
material conditions will ultimately determine the success or failure of any such project.
260
 
In stark contrast to this retreat into the ideal, scrutiny of Soviet visions of criminalizing 
aggressive war in light of actually-existing conditions provides us with a rich tapestry 
showcasing the ways in which critique, implementation practices, and structural 
contradictions operated in a manner that exposed the highest ideals as being 
fundamentally constrained by actually-existing realities. The Soviets were actively aware 
of these material dimensions but nonetheless proved incapable of overcoming them. 
Does this cast serious doubt on the ability of any analogous project that does not even 
consider materiality to ever succeed on its own terms?
 261
 That said, so long as there 
remains an impulse to articulate universal justice in a deeply uneven world, 
understanding the multifaceted material life of Soviet world visions that placed faith in 
the transformative force of criminalizing aggressive war continues to offer valuable 
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